

An Ethical Analysis of In-Vitro Fertilization (IVF) in Mary Warnock's Philosophy

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Abstract

Infertility is a significant problem for many couples. Estimates suggest that many married couples experience difficulty in conceiving and carrying a pregnancy to term. Statistically, the causes of this infertility are seemingly split between issues in the reproductive system of the man and that of the woman. The underlying causes are many and varied: low sperm count due to environmental factors; congenital abnormalities in the reproductive system; past injuries to the uterus, ovaries, or fallopian tubes due to previous surgeries, abortions, or chemical contraceptive use; the normal decline of the woman's fertility in the years approaching menopause; and other factors that are being investigated. Identifying the likely causes of infertility is the first step in knowing whether procreating a child is possible. The gap in this research is that some philosophers from different epochs of life see IVF to be problematic in nature. They argued that the human embryo is the moral equivalent of a human adult or child and as such, is due for the utmost respect. It should never be handled or manipulated outside of the body, and it should never be subjected to research. Some think that the embryo should only be manipulated if the procedure will directly benefit the embryo itself and humanity at large. Adopting an analytic method, this paper seeks to discuss Mary Warnock's position on IVF and embryo transfer to make a philosophical inquiry into the ethical implications of Warnock's discourse in the field of IVF. Thus, following the above streamline, this paper is aimed to achieve the following: (i) To expose and present Mary Warnock's thoughts on the ethics of IVF; (ii) To analyze Warnock's thoughts on IVF from an ethical position. In the end, this work serves as a ladder to understanding the question of children having a fundamental human nature whether or not humans in their very nature are to make use of that potential is a matter of adequate scientific and moral thinking that always takes into account that the embryo is placed in that position by human action.

Keywords: In Vitro Fertilization IVF, reproductive system, manipulated, congenital, and abnormalities.

Introduction

Despite the profound changes in the social status of women and norms of gender equality that occurred worldwide in the latter decades of the twentieth century, fertility and parenting remain important to social standing and self-identity for both women and men all over the world. Although it is widely recognized that reproductive freedom is central to women's ability to lead autonomous lives, it is evident that higher levels of women's education are correlated with lower numbers of children. Still, voluntary childlessness does not appear common, and involuntary childlessness remains seeming stigmatic. The experience of infertility is shaped by social context and can be devastating, especially for women (Gilai-Ginor 2010, p.34). For some women, "barrenness" appears to be a source of shame and social suffering. For men, the inability to produce offspring is a humiliation and a slight on manhood. The condition of infertility, as such, is a source of suffering for many couples undergoing the experience.

It is a natural need to have offspring, and human beings have, in the course of history, strived to have children through the use of medicine and assisted reproductive techniques (ARTs), in case they cannot do so through the natural way. Formerly, it was in terms of herbal medicine and traditional techniques, but recently, with the advance of science and technology, other means have surfaced, such as *in vitro* fertilization (IVF), surrogacy, **intra**vaginal insemination (IVI), **intra**cervical insemination (ICI), and **intra**uterine insemination (IUI). They are the result of human commitment to satisfying the desire to have children and strengthening family bonds. But the utilization of IVF comes with many moral and ethical issues that question the way the practices are conducted and some conditions attached to them. *In vitro* Fertilization (IVF) is one of the processes of assisted reproductive technologies that consist of taking an egg from a woman, fertilizing it in a laboratory dish, and implanting the fertilized ova into that woman's uterus. Hence, we can state that IVF works by using a combination of medicines and surgical procedures to help sperm fertilize an egg and help the fertilized egg implant in a woman's uterus. In more complex permutations of IVF, third parties known or unknown to the couple become involved in the reproductive process. It is now technically possible to use donated sperm, donated eggs, and donated embryos. In the future, it may even be possible to use an artificial uterus to bring an infant to term completely outside of the womb. While some argue that even

"simple" IVF is objectionable, these variations on the simplest form of *in vitro* fertilization raise additional ethical questions.

At a basic level, some believe that society should not allow any of the reproductive technology's artificial insemination, surrogate motherhood, sex pre-selection, *in vitro* fertilization, etc. because they separate the conjugal act from the procreative act. This is seen as both unnatural and a threat to the unity of the family and the dignity of the human person (Chaudhar 2001, p.5). Others would argue that the world is already overpopulated and that those unfortunate couples not able to conceive naturally should adopt a child rather than struggle to conceive their biological child. A related question is whether it is right to expend the significant economic resources required to create just one child through IVF when our healthcare resources are already strained. As with many other new or exotic medical procedures, there are questions about the fair allocation of resources and the selection of patients for the IVF program. Most IVF programs and professional societies dealing with reproductive technologies approve the use of IVF services for married couples, and some accept unmarried heterosexual couples who have established lasting and stable relationships. The availability of IVF, however, to lesbian couples and single women is much more restricted (Austriaco 2008, p.6). Other women may be rejected from IVF programs because they are too old, because they already have children, or because they are unable to pay for the procedure.

IVF and human embryo research continue to play important roles in the development of public policy and regulations governing IVF. Agencies and commissions in Great Britain, Australia, Canada, and the United States have all studied the issues and made different recommendations. In the United Kingdom, moral philosopher, Mary Warnock, formed the *Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilization and Embryology* in 1982. Taking into account the middle way which involves using scientific data to try and reconcile supporters and opponents of embryo research. Warnock argued that permitting experiments up to fourteen days after fertilization, when antecedents of the nervous system begin to form, would retain many utilitarian benefits while offending as few people as possible. But this decision was heavily criticized by other bioethicists, in addition to supporters and opponents of research. Regardless of the emergence of "official bioethics," the question of "where to draw the line," and who should draw it, remained publicly contentious. In this work, therefore, I

shall explore some of the ethical issues related to IVF, with a particular focus on Warnock's thoughts on the practice. I shall also be providing a philosophical examination of Warnock's approach and arguments on the subject, as well as the significance of her thoughts on IVF practice to contemporary society.

Warnock's Thought on IVF

The Warnock report made 64 recommendations that focused predominantly on regulating IVF. The principal part of the report outlined provisions for a regulatory body, which would later become the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA). Its main purpose is to license and oversee IVF and human embryo research. The committee recommended that this "new statutory licensing authority be established to regulate both research and those infertility services which we have recommended should be subject to control (Warnock 1978, p.19). The report also had a series of recommendations for IVF. In addition, Warnock argues that there were nine recommendations related to human embryo research, which she states as follows:

- i. We recommend that the embryo of the human species should be afforded some protection in law.
- ii. Any unauthorized use of an *in vitro* embryo would in itself constitute a criminal offense.
- iii. Legislation should provide that research may be carried out on any embryo resulting from IVF, whatever its provenance, up to the end of the 14th day after fertilization, but subject to all other restrictions as may be imposed by the licensing body.
- iv. It shall be a criminal offense to handle or to use as a research subject any live human embryo derived from IVF beyond that limit (i.e. 14 days after fertilization).
- v. No embryo which has been used for research should be transferred to a woman
- vi. Any unlicensed use of trans-species fertilization involving human gametes should be a criminal offense.
- vii. The placing of a human embryo in the uterus of another species for gestation should be a criminal offense

- viii. The proposed licensing body promulgates guidance on what types of research, apart from those precluded by law, would be unlikely to be considered ethically acceptable in any circumstances and therefore would not be licensed (Warnock, 1978, p.22).

The committee listened to a variety of opinions regarding the rights of human embryos. One of the main arguments against using human embryos for research was that they are morally wrong because of the very fact that they are human” (Warnock, 1978, p.44). However, others like IVF researcher Robert Edwards think that it is very important to balance future benefits such that a baby for an infertile couple is properly equipped with full medical knowledge against pain or any genetic harm to the embryo (Warnock, 1978, p.85).

Warnock on the Conditionality for IVF

Following the success of the birth of the first child resulting from the technique of *in vitro* fertilization IVF in July 1978 was a considerable achievement, Warnock avers that “the technique opened up new horizons in the alleviation of infertility and the science of embryology” (Warnock, 1988, p.45). Thus, following Warnock's position above, one can argue that Warnock recommends a certain limit that gives no autonomy to a person been over represented in the gene pool, which might lead to involuntary and unwitting incest. The condition for *in vitro fertilization* according to Warnock is to assist a woman having issues with conceiving or formation of embryos. In the sense that fertilization would artificially occur outside of the body of the woman, and then the embryo would be moved back into her womb for development making IVF an appropriate solution perhaps for more than five percent of infertile couples that have medical difficulties.

Against this background of public excitement and concern for society, the foreword rejects a cost-benefit analysis of assisted reproductive technologies and embryological research, arguing that the moral character of the issues involved demanded an answer to the question of whether it is right that those technologies be allowed in the first place. The report says that no calculation of aggregate goods for society could answer that question. It goes on to argue that some limits on behavior must be in place for any society to be morally just. This is to say that, the very human person most especially in his very true nature surrounds himself with the issues of birth and death. Which gives value to an individual life and the structure of

his family. Thus, Warnock on the other hand argues that the ultimate concern to be addressed by the committee was the question of what kind of society is morally praiseworthy, and what recommendations are appropriate to make the current society more morally praiseworthy.

The Ontological Arguments for IVF

The keyword in ontological arguments concerning human embryos is 'moral statuses'. The term is used by Warnock in determining the moral status of the human embryo. The word 'status' in this context is most intriguing in its connection with morality. According to Alpert, the stress that the 'status' of an embryo has three meanings, as he argues that:

The first rank or position within a hierarchy, second, is the condition of something or some being in the eyes of the law, while the third is that, the state or condition of something or being concerning circumstances. Concerning 'moral status' the first two meanings seem to be most appropriate (Alpert, 2006, p.6)

The moral status of the human embryo can then be defined as the ranking of the human embryo in a hierarchy of morally respectful beings protected by law. This definition, therefore, creates the need to assess the moral ranking. Following the above argument, Warner develops seven principles or criteria to do so, and in this way, she attributes or ascribes moral respect to the entity of a human being (William, 1973, p.6). This process of attribution or ascription has to do with the ontological perspective of the human embryo and how its existence is made possible in biotechnology. The existence of the human embryo outside the womb is in itself a human artifact, and its being is dependent on the circumstances in a scientific and technological context. Walters and LeRoy argue that “outside the womb, it cannot develop into a fetus, a child or an adult. It lacks the necessary environment that can control its growth and development. But it can still be described as a human being a human embryo differs from those of pigs, apes, etc.” (Zviya and Witztum, 2010, p11)

This abstract in Austriaco words description corresponds with the meaning of the word 'ontology', or theory of being, as was defined in the age of Descartes: *A Uniform Scientific and Metaphysical Theory of Being*, he argues that is stripped from every kind of essence or intrinsic meaning which probably coined the word in his lexicon which implies that morality and other meanings are, according to that theory, the result of human

activities in attribution and ascription (Austriaco, 2008, p.7). However, this is not what the ontological arguments about moral status try to prove. They want to show exactly the opposite, namely that human embryos have some kind of intrinsic meaning that excludes them from being part of any human activity other than procreation.

To make this possible, the term 'human being' accrues a general, abstract moral significance. The type of reasoning then becomes as follows: a human embryo is (at some stage of its development) a human being. All human beings deserve the same kind of moral respect. Therefore, human embryos deserve the same respect as we give to other human beings. Discussion is, of course, still possible about the brackets at some stage of development in the first clause. Some will say that the human embryo is in full human existence at the moment of the fusion of gametes, others will say that it takes 14 days, and again others might say that it takes 41 days. These possibilities do not, however, change the basic structure that identifies a human embryo as a human being that deserves the same respect as every human being.

As Gómez-Lobo recently stated:

I have developed continuously and gradually, without gaps, from the embryo that was conceived by my parents. If I trace my life back through space and time, I arrive at that embryo...and this is confirmed by the fact that I have the same genome that I had when I was conceived'. Besides identity (sameness), continuity in time and potentiality or capacity to grow are considered to be included within the concept of human beings (1994, p. 8).

Each of these properties, sameness, continuity, and potentiality, thus link our daily existence with the human embryo in the laboratory; a link that is established by the shift of the moral meaning of persons to an abstract, logical description of an entity. From biology, we know that the human embryo does not stay the same and possesses only a partial genetic identity. Furthermore, its continuity of being depends on its relations with the surrounding environment. It has only potentiality or capacity when it is being cared for in a favorable surrounding like the womb. In other words, we cannot treat the human embryo outside the womb 'as if' it were inside a womb. Outside the womb, it has only a limited chance of survival that has to be provided by the environment. One might even say that it has a different status of being, and thus a different moral status. The womb is

more than a separating wall or a protection bag.

Arguments for Warnock's Thoughts on IVF

Warnock's argument for IVF is from the position of a practical, instrumental argument. For separation between the human embryo and the womb has, of course, not very much significance in the daily practice of *in vitro* fertilization (IVF). Embryos are being created on purpose, artificially, outside the womb. The embryos might even develop in a new environment as in the case of egg donation and surrogate motherhood. Separating embryos from the womb makes this possible, but in due course, it is hoped that the embryo will develop like any other. It has the same, perhaps even more, moral value as in a normal pregnancy. Still, the act of separation makes it possible to look at an embryo as a special kind of human tissue. Most of the ethicists and scientists who defend the instrumental position do not adhere to this view. They do not embrace the possible reduction of an embryo to a tiny piece of cellular tissue. They acknowledge that human embryos deserve some amount of special respect, albeit a low-status ranking, and then proceed by arguing that it is permissible to use them for goals with higher moral value.

This debate of means-to-an-end gives the human embryo an instrumental value that has to be measured by looking at the goal for which it is used. When specific conditions are fulfilled, the goal can be attained by using embryos. As Vidal avers:

Research into the development of cell-replacement therapy requires the instrumental use of pre-implementation embryos from which hES cells are derived since current technology requires lysis of the trophectoderm and culture of the inner cell mass; the embryo disintegrates and is thus destroyed. The dominant view in ethics is that the instrumental use of pre-implementation embryos, in the light of their relative moral value, can be justified under certain conditions.' So, we have to look for the conditions that enable us to make instrumental use of the embryos (2011, p. 1).

This search for conditions or criteria takes time and causes all kinds of background stands the moral status, but the debate will concentrate on issues of possible risk, success, and so on. Utilitarian reasoning, in which the possible happiness of the many takes precedence over the luck of an individual, is combined with the conditions in which the goal justifies the

means.

An example is given by Warnock as she looks for the justification of the conditions in moral theories of 'just war'. In wartime as well as in cases of triage medicine, one has to make decisions to sacrifice human beings to save others and the community. Means that are normally considered as immoral, can thus be justified, which she rejects the comparison but at a point accepts its possibilities.

Arguments against Warnock's Thought on IVF

The Warnock Report of 1984 invoked the special statuses of the human embryo as 'the original justification' for IVF regulation in the UK. While the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act 1990 has been revisited several times, it remains the case that the status of the embryo is regarded as the starting point for consideration of the ethics of research on human embryos (Chaudhary, 2001, p.4). On this same ground, it was argued in the UK that as a joint committee of both houses of parliament stated in 2007, we acknowledge that the special status of the embryo means regulation of both research and treatment continues to be appropriate and desirable.

Millbank is one of the advocates who argue against Warnock's Thought on IVF, a critique of the framing of Australian regulation; thus applies equally to regulation in the UK parliament on the future of IVF. In reaction to Millbank's position, Warnock reports in subsequent parliamentary debates became responsible for creating this space for the embryo as a contested but constantly centered ethical subject, not-quite-life but not-mere-cells. He argued that "A direct consequence of the focus on the seemingly interminable debate over the moral status of the human embryo is that other important ethical aspects of IVF have been marginalized" (Warnock, 1985, p.72). Thus, the most significant contribution of Millbank's position in the argument against Warnock's Thought on IVF is to redirect attention to the perspective of the woman undertaking treatment. This perspective is explored through listening to the voices of women themselves: emerging from this exploration is a critique of abstract notions of regard for embryos and the development of a relational sense of the embryo that centers the woman and values the meaning of the embryo to her (Warnock, 1985, p.102)

This commentary aims not to defend IVF regulation in the UK or Australia against Millbank's often justified critique, but rather to argue that some of Warnock's arguments need to be pursued further and with more

consistency. Warnock argues that “a focus on the 'special status' of the embryo has led to 'the disappearance of women in this framework’” (Warnock 1985, p.112) However, she fails to question whether the rhetoric of 'special status' really functions to give 'primacy or 'centrality' to the embryo or to recognize the embryo as a rights-bearing entity that requires protection. In the context of the UK, at least, this language arguably has the opposite function. UK public policy on IVF is driven by the desire of the government to enable the work of clinicians and scientists while at the same time maintaining public confidence. Thus, public support for embryo research in the UK is high, but surveys consistently show that it is contingent on the existence of strict regulations. Regulation, ostensibly based on the attribution of 'special statuses to the embryo, is thus utilized by the government not because it inhibits or restricts experimentation on human embryos but precisely because it helps facilitate such experimentation. This paradox has been called 'deregulation via regulation'. I have argued elsewhere that discussion of the status of the human embryo in the UK, therefore, functions as a cipher for other concerns, principally the maintenance of public confidence. This analysis seems at least *prima facie* applicable to the discussion of IVF in some other parts of the world as an appeal to the special status of the human embryo also seems to function in Australia to promote, rather than inhibit, liberal access to a wide range of state-subsidized treatment practices.

From this perspective, it is not an accident or a 'perverse effect' of the law that rhetorical commitment to the embryo's welfare 'may require its destruction'. The true object of concern is not the welfare or protection of the embryo but the management of public opinion. The public is reassured by the establishment of regulations and by the stipulation of rules which scientists deem reasonable. It is not only the woman who is undergoing IVF who has disappeared from this frame; so also has the embryo she conceives.

Feminist Perspective of IVF

Feminist writing on IVF and the New Reproductive Technology NRF constitutes an extensive, heterogeneous, and constantly evolving body of work and, as such, the feminist approach articulated here should be understood as a contribution to that body of work, rather than attempting to make a definitive statement about it. My goal here, then, is not to speak for feminism or feminists, but to set out an approach for thinking about the NRTs through feminism in a way that allows an explicitly political

situatedness to augment the analytical possibilities of social science research in this field.

The approach articulated here begins from the understanding that while the feminist writing on the NRTs is markedly heterogeneous, a shared feature of this writing and research is the centralizing of women about those technologies. But this orienting principle can only ever be the starting point of an approach that substantively informs research and analytical practice, and to articulate the specificities of this approach, I have set the heterogeneous feminist debates against a backdrop of three proliferating broad areas of research: gender, science and technology, and the body. In exploring the complex ways in which these fields of research intersect, it becomes possible to think about IVF not as an isolated, immutable relic that is inherently bad (or good) for women an understanding which inevitably then demands a political stance of embrace or rejection about it but as a cultural formation (Gilai-Ginor, 2010, p.96) which has been developed along a particular, but not inevitable, trajectory. Both the technologies and their effects, then, are understood here as a product of the articulation between technologies, cultural narratives, social, economic, and institutional forces' (Gilai-Ginor, 2010, p.162). However, while there is nothing inevitable or immutable about reproductive technologies, the discursive practices and networks of power relations through which the technologies are constructed are persistent and powerful, constituting significant limitations to the transgressive or liberatory potential of the technologies. In particular, discourses of gender, of the natural inevitability of reproduction as the only fulfilling life course for women, and of scientific knowledge as benign, progressive, and capable of understanding and controlling reproduction are implicated in the construction and maintenance of the current technological formations and practices.

This is not to suggest that the meaning of IVF is discursively produced to the exclusion of the material body; the body is not treated here as a natural 'thing' in opposition to cultural signification, or as the blank material upon which culture is inscribed. Indeed, the exclusion of the material female body in the dominant discourses of IVF can be seen as one of its most pernicious effects. Instead, I wish to follow Balsamo in treating the body as a site of mutually constitutive interaction between discourses about the body and the materiality of specific bodies emphasis in the original (Richard, 1986, p.163). That is to say that there is no universal female body, only bodies whose material specificities directly impact the body that is

produced in the interaction with culture (Beauchamp and Childress, 2009, p.91). They further argued that:

The engagement with IVF is never without consequence, and that the material-discursive body will always be modified and marked by it, even when it fails. The analysis, then, seeks out the processes by which those marks are created, sustained, and resisted, and the ways they can be seen to change and be changed over time (Beauchamp and Childress, 2009, p.200).

In setting out the background to the approach upon which this book is based, Warnock divided the analysis into four key areas: first, the reasons for the centralizing of women's experiences; secondly, the dominant discourses of gender, science and the female body, and feminist responses to these; thirdly, the relationship between gender and technology; and fourthly, feminist writing specifically on the NRTs. In the final section of the chapter, I set out the key features of the approach taken in the book, and describe briefly the process of data collection and analysis in the context of this framework.

Utilitarian Defense of IVF

Assisted reproductive technology (ART) by in-vitro fertilization (IVF) is currently a commonplace technology that has successfully treated millions of infertile couples the world over. Rule Utilitarianism deals with the tendencies of actions to produce more pleasure and is concerned with long-term consequences. Use of Reproductive Technology for the extraction of gametes and in-vitro conception, namely the separation of reproduction and detachment from the harmony, physiology, and emotional psychology of sexual intercourse. This creates ethical issues of a spiritual character that touch upon the value of man and life. Utilitarian's concern about the IVF being used for selfish advantage as this would go against the general principle of social welfare for the maximum number of people. The right to childbirth, a rights-based ethic can become individual as newborn babies have rights, but they do not own any duties towards others. Utilitarianism what it stands for believed that with more families being happier than those disappointed or in abusive situations then, the right to a child should be a law. The statuses of embryos and frozen embryos have an uncertain fate. An embryo has no autonomy and therefore is not a person. For this reason, it cannot feature in the higher and lower pleasure argument because of the age of the mother when it was found that infertility treatments can be

applied to postmenopausal women, this would not have been possible. More happy people mean more happiness and are therefore considered better because of the procreation autonomy, which is a natural right for every man to procreate, which is grounded on the right to self-determination and on the right to found a family. Utilitarianism on the other hand reflects that if having a child will make people deeply unhappy, chances are the child's not going to turn out too happy either. Utilitarians might support the procedure of IVF if there is strong evidence to support the view that it will lead to a society in which the welfare of its members will be served.

Arguing from the utilitarian point of view, one will be left at the mercy of the rationalist argument. Their position on this issue is from the point of morals. For them, morals and ethics can be considered typical human endeavors that take moral intentionality and responsibility into account. Just like Singer, Warnock argues that “animals, ants or donkeys, do have and develop rules of conducts and strategies for survival, but it is an oxymoron to endow ants or donkeys with moral intentional and responsible behavior” (Warnock 1989, p.12). Now to say, the goodness for the greater amount of people, utilitarianism will put in arguments that are number conscious. Since science and technology have neglected the moral dimension of their endeavor for the good of the majority “number” for quite some time, the dominant perspective has been that the science and technology of IVF only depend on conditions regarding truth or likelihood in theoretical thinking about the human embryo. This kind of thinking is recognizable in the above-mentioned ontological approach, Warnock is of the opinion that:

The issue of IVF considers reality only in so far as it corresponds to abstract reasoning. During the last century, we have learned and experienced that the utilitarian approaches to IVF fail when it comes to how science and technology are used. That use does not merely fit the world as it is, but instead changes the world (1989, p.23)

Nowadays we know that the growth of science and technology of IVF has permanently changed the human mentality toward childbirth and the dignity of human embryos and the differentiation of life on this planet. In other words, we are becoming aware that our deep knowledge of IVF has made an artificial change to the human instinct toward embryo and have

made mankind responsible for the world as it is and will become. Consciously and unconsciously, the existence of mankind depends on man's interventions in this world.

Conclusion

From the foregoing, it may be inferred that Warnock, has argued that studying debates on reproductive medicine will help us appreciate the demand for bioethics in not only Britain but all over the world. Thus, bioethics gained currency for IVF in this period because it fulfilled and linked the ambitions of politicians, scientists, and doctors, and those figures in law and philosophy who went on to become 'ethical experts. Against this background, the study has shown that the signs of a profound moral crisis of IVF and childbirth are very impossible to be ignored. From all indications, one will come to a solid stand that, human embryos can nowadays be kept alive outside the womb. In that case, they are subjected to human decision-making about what will be done with them. As long as there is an intention to place them into a womb, they are respected as potentially human beings. If this is not the case, they must be dealt with as they are: human cells with great potential. Thus, to consider recent and potential developments in medicine and science related to human fertilization and embryology; to consider what policies and safeguards should be applied, including consideration of the social, ethical, and legal implications of these developments; and to make recommendations. Whether or not we are to make use of that potential is a matter of adequate scientific and moral thinking that always takes into account that the embryo is placed in that position by human action. Thus, to an extent this work agrees with Warnock's position on IVF based on the ground that, there is hope for infertility, sternites, etc. but on the contrary, it is very expensive and unaffordable to the common man, with the procedures sometimes complicated with seventy-one percent failure rate.

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