

ACTING PERSON AND THE EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION OF
MORALITY IN THE PARADOX OF THE MODERN SELF

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Abstract

The ontology of the natural order makes the human person a subject of rationality, authenticity, dynamism and intelligibility. These qualities necessarily and indispensably help the individual as an Acting Person to sustain the moral affinity of love, care, justice, equity and peace. With these qualities of epistemic personification and social resemblance, the Acting Person is demanded to coordinate his or her affairs and actions in effecting social order and discipline, then ethically achieving the courses of integral humanism. This is epistemological foundation of Karol Wojtyla's existential phenomenology of Acting Person as a subject of lived experience. Such philosophy recognises that the human capacity and capability have the courses of natural-moral orders by his or her natural moral reasoning and their epistemic justification. Hence, the paper questions the fate of the Acting Person in the paradox of the "modern self. It recognises that the paradox of the "modern self" as an acting agent of modern development is dependent on a world that is demarcated on the values of the Culture of War and the Culture of Peace. The Acting Person as a "modern self" rather than as an "integral self" is more concern about what he or she offers to the world by his or her very self irrespective of the moral means of achieving such development. Adopting phenomenological mode of analysis, the paper concluded that the recognition of the good and the bad, the right and the wrong, resides in the rational capacity of the Acting Person in justifying his or her moral experiences, and then develop the social consciousness to sustain his or her self-authenticity and self-subjectivity through actions that morally make the person more human

Keywords: *Acting Person, Culture of War, Moral Justification, Karol Wojtyla, Culture of Peace, Human Consciousness, Lived Experiences*

Introduction

The interpretation and applicative exercises of lived experiences necessarily and indispensably define the valued contents of one's action at the present, then the future. This is knowledge of living and development that determine the relationship between the past, present and the future.¹ Through creativities and innovations, knowledge advance, and this

¹See, P. O Isanbor and P. A. Edema, Environment and the Emergence of Dehumanised Future. *Cogito: Multidisciplinary Research Journal*, Vol. XIV, No. 3, Sept., 2022, pp. 28-42.

cannot be disputed or debunk as far as human reasoning is concerned. The causes of ascertaining the nature and mode of knowledge claim have been the acts of objective altercation of human experiences, especially through all philosophical quests of epistemic relevance, even spread to other disciplines. This knowledge both as instinctive and sensational, characterizes the existence of the human person. This characterization is due to the ontological conviction that the human person can grow and has the ability to expand the corridors of experiences, and thanks to the extension of its knowledge frontiers. Integral human development is shaped by knowledge, and which develop some level of certainty in every quest for human advancement. Although, it is not every certainty that is knowledge; but all knowledge is a certainty.

With an indispensable knowledge in valuing the contents of one's lived experiences in the pursuit of integral humanism, we are coming to the understanding that the ethical concern of Karol Wojtyla is on the *Existential Phenomenology of the Human Person* as a subject of lived experience. Such philosophy expresses that the Individual as an *Acting Person* by knowing, valuing and applying the contents of his or her lived experiences in fashioning his or her present and future.² It recognises that the human society advances meaningfully where the human person who has a duty to express his or her creativity and intelligibility in right conscience and freedom. With right or true freedom, morality and society must be connected, for the sake of proper and integral integration of human affairs and interests, and with which the morality in the soul of the society.³

In the moral sphere, such development of prepositions out of human experiences, helps the human individual and his or her society in order to develop moral and ethical statements for the guidance or regulation of human actions and events, and they remain products of human intellectually and rational capacities and capabilities, as aspects of human beingness that differentiate the human person from other creatures. For this, as Pope John Paul II, as posited that;

It is an integral and solidary humanism capable of creating a new social, economic and political order, founded on the dignity and freedom of every human person, to be brought about in peace, justice and solidarity. This humanism can become a reality if individual men and women and their communities are able to cultivate moral and social virtues in themselves and spread them in society. Education strengthens this hope of development in humanity, and with the intensity of the needs of it, the society can never do well without it.⁴

What the human person knows about him/herself are what he or she uses to guide his or her actions and other dealings in his or her society, and then, his or her ethical and moral knowledge are not an exception to this experience. So, "ethics are not necessarily unrealistic. Likewise, utopia does not only signify the impossible. There exists, it is true, a bad utopia, that

²Cf, A. N. Woznicki, *A Christian Humanism: Karol Wojtyla's Existential Personalism*. New Britain: Mariel Publications, 1980, p. 34.

³G. E. Ogbenika, *African Philosophy and the Quest for Development in Africa*. Benin City: Mindex, 2020, p. 56

⁴John Paul II, *Centesimus annus*. Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1991, no. 45.

of a perfect society, totally harmonious, without conflicts and contradiction. Good utopias are based on possibilities that are not yet realisable.”⁵ Therein, the act of understanding the human person is easily possible when one assesses the philosophical impulses of existence and to know that its socio-problematic issues are epistemologically concerned to the values of the human lived experiences. As Julian Marias puts it that: “in philosophy, the problem in philosophy itself.”⁶ Why is philosophy a problem to its very self, especially asking and raising some questions which it cannot readily proffer answers to them? Simply recognized is the fact of arguing about whys and natures of truth where the same truth is always therein, mainly concerned what are happening in the domain of science, and sometime, far from the same philosophy and then religion itself.

Karol Wojtyla (Pope John Paul II) and the Knowledge of *Acting Person* as Moral Agent of Development

As a neo-Thomist philosopher and theologian, Karol Wojtyla bridges metaphysics, existentialism and phenomenology, and with hermeneutic of thoughts he analyses the phenomenology of human objectivity and subjectivity in order to explain his conception of the person as a moral agent of development.⁷ His analysis does not favour one above the other; rather, he bridges the objective and the subjective in his exposition of the person. His view on the person is explicitly revealed in his *Magnus Opus, The Acting Person* 1979.⁸ According to Woznicki,

As an ethician, Wojtyla searches for the criterion of human experiences in the moral behaviour of man as the most sensitive and “visible” test of man's “self-completion” through his actions. Moreover, in the moral order of human actions, human freedom conceived as self-determination experiences its highest value: What is essential is this: that fulfilment as a subjective reality given to us also in the experience of conscience- though not limited or reduced to that experience- is clearly connected with transcendence. *Man fulfils himself*: he realises the auto-teleology of his personal self *through the transcendent dimension of his action (operari)*. The transcendence of truth and of the good has a decisive influence in forming the personal subject, as is perfectly evident in the analysis of conscience and morality.⁹

For Wojtyla; the cosmological inspiration backed with theological and social conviction to embark upon the phenomenological study of the human person as an acting agent of development necessarily “came from the need to objectivize that great cognitive process

⁵Edgar Morin, “Future Ethics and Politics” In Jerome Binde (ed). *The Future of Value: 21st century Talks*. Paris: UNESCO Publication, 2004, p. 242.

⁶Julian Marias, *History of Philosophy*. Translated from the Spanish by Stanley Appelbaum and Clarence Strowbridge. NY: Dover, 1967, p. 5.

⁷Cf, A. N. Woznicki, *A Christian Humanism: Karol Wojtyla's Existential Personalism*, p. 2.

⁸Cf, P. A. Edema & A. V. Bukete, Social Dependency and Conflict Resolution: An Application of Karol Wojtyla's (Pope John Paul II) Philosophy in Nigeria, *Albertine Journal of Philosophy and Related Disciplines*, Vol. 2, 2018, pp. 18-39, p. 29; Cyril Udebunu, “John Paul II, the Catholic church and the new world order.” In S. C. Chukwujekwu (ed). *Personalism and Humanism in the Philosophy of Pope John Paul II*. Okpuno-Awka: Pope John Paul II Major Seminary, 2007, pp. 166-167.

⁹A. N. Woznicki, *A Christian Humanism: Karol Wojtyla's Existential Personalism*. New Britain: Mariel Publications, 1980, p. 57.

which at its origin may be defined as the experience of man.” The desires of acquiring and sustaining lived experience remain enduring and indispensable as far as the human lives are sustained; and such experiences make such human person, and make him or her worthy of living and assessable to others and to the world. According to him,

Man's experience of anything outside of himself is always associated with the experience of himself, and he never experiences anything external without having at the same time the experience of himself.¹⁰

Herein, Karol Wojtyla is of the view that a right adaptation of cooperation of the knowledge of one's past in the relation of the present can only result from a good grasp of the nature of human action.¹¹ It is imperative that in social acting, the human person does not become a slave for other members of the society. On the contrary, the *Acting Person* can attain his or her self-fulfilment and self-dynamism only through communal acting being expressed in truth. It is on the understanding of one's self-fulfilment and self-dynamism through moral exertion of one's self-participation and self-authenticity by the cooperation with *other* persons, of which he recognised that:

The human person acts because he exhibits the two elements - existence and morality. The human person is the only acting being in the world. The actions of the human person make him morally good or morally bad. Our chosen actions do not merely bring about effects external to us; they also form our dispositions and characters. We are what we act. Morality is attributed to the human person because we are able to act.¹²

Existence is inseparable from morality, and as one's existence is dependable on level of one's cognition. Cognition is about how much the individual can remember, and in terms of morality, it is about the nature and contents of what the individual can put values in, as a subject of lived experience.¹³ Morality is dependable on the level of one's cognition, since the ethical operability of one's lived experience defines one's disposition, dynamism and participation in the present, and thereafter, determines one's future. For one's cognition rest on one's experience, and this is where true values and content of one's moral judgment of actions and choices lie. The individual as an *Acting Person* is valued based on the character of his or her simplicity or complexity as resulted from the cognitive operability of his or her lived experiences. As existentially put, the individual as an *Acting Person* directs the affairs of one's happiness or suffering based on the values placed on one's life, rights and dignity, as such obtaining social order, harmony and togetherness. In the world of lived experience, an *Acting Person* is not alone in the joys and suffering of the society. He or she is the reality which is accessible to the self and to others through his or her responsive actions and choices. He or she defines human presence, nearness, fullness and life through responsive interpretation and applications of the contents of lived experience. The knowledge of one's existence supersedes certainty of the presence, for the latter is dependent on one's action and freedom.¹⁴

¹⁰Karol, Wojtyla, *The Acting Person*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publ. Co., 1979, p.1

¹¹See, Karol, Wojtyla, *The Acting Person*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publ. Co., 1979, pp.263-264.

¹²John Paul II, *Evangelium Vitae*. Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1988, no. 87.

¹³See, Karol, Wojtyla, *The Acting Person*, p. 4.

¹⁴See, F. H. Odimegwu, “Globalization and African identity.” In M. F. Asiegbu and J. A. Agbakoba (eds). *Philosophy and praxis in Africa*, (pp. 309-328). Ibadan: Hope, 2006, see, pp. 316-317.

The *Acting Person* is the place at which and through which everything that is real exists for the self and for others. He or she makes necessary efforts not to fail to be human and to avoid being slip into nothingness. The *Acting Person*, through his or her actions and choices, is not a self sufficient separate entity, but is constituted by the things he or she makes of his or her own responsive efforts of development.¹⁵ In every form of his or her being, the *Acting Person* is related to something other than himself or herself as a being to his or her world; as consciousness to objects, as spirit to the idea of whatever constitutes totality of existence, and actively recognises that existence is transcendence. Within the analysis of the problem of an adequate interpretation of ethical experience for concrete understanding of human actions in relation to his or her *Beingness*, as an ethical entity, Karol Wojtyla posits that,

By ethical value I mean that through which the human being as a human being, as a concrete person, is simply good or bad, ethical being is a qualification of the very person as a rational and free concrete being, and this is why the phenomenological “place” of ethical value is not its real place. From experience, we know that ethical value is not just that which we experience “in a person” as his or her “goodness” or “badness,” but consists in the fact that this person as a person is simply good or bad. If, in turn, we wish to emphasize the nevertheless accidental character of ethical value in relation to the very being of the person, then we will say that ethical value is that through which a given person as a person is good or bad.¹⁶

With ethical actions of development, the sense of epistemic justification of morality questions the human capacity and capability to differentiate the good from the bad, and the bad from the good, and having the epistemic justification to sustain the social consciousness which help to embrace rational behaviours away from the animalistic ones. As intelligently and rationally put, it is in knowing the individual as a person or as a being of experiences that the whole of the human society is really known.¹⁷ As Robert O'Donnell puts it; “while a human being's knowledge always begin with sense experiences, it does not end there, for of all animals, the human animal alone has a higher power of knowledge which we call the mind or the intellect.”⁵² “It is the function of my human mind to transform the sense images provided to me by my imagination and sense memory. It transforms them from individual images or images of individual thing into ideas which are no longer individual but rather universal”¹⁸

Epistemic Justification of Morality in Karol Wojtyla's Phenomenology of the *Acting Person*

The meaning of morality is beyond its epistemic definition or classification. It is more about its ontological nature and acceptance, since it is centred on the values of human conscious personality, that is, the propensity of his or her conscience as it relates with the contents and intentions of his or her actions and choices. It is from the understanding of the naturalness of

¹⁵Cf, A. N. Woznicki, *A Christian Humanism: Karol Wojtyla's Existential Personalism*, p. 20.

¹⁶K. Wojtyla, “The Problem of the Will in the Analysis of the Ethical Act” In K. Wojtyla, *Person and Community: selected essays*. Translated by Theresa Sandok. NY: Peter Lang, 1993, p. 132.

¹⁷Karl Jaspers, *Philosophy in the Existentialist Tradition*, Ed. NY: Nino Languilli, 1971, p. 158.

¹⁷Robert A. O'Donnell, p. 3.

¹⁸Robert A. O'Donnell, p. 3.

the individual as an *Acting Person*. Through the epistemic verification of human interests as products of development, the social project of naturalising ethics by affirming the methodological infirmity of ethics on the ontological relevance of the human person. This situates the indispensability of ethics or morality in the development of the human person as an agent of social justification, as it is a product of his or her naturalness.¹⁹ But, for Karol Wojtyla, “it may even seem strange that we have already ready questions that somehow presuppose that we know what morality is. What asked, “What makes human actions morally good or evil?” and in posing the question in this way.”²⁰ Such questions like: what is morality? What constitutes what is good or evil? And the likes, are all epistemic questionings that demand some regular foundation of what constitute the true human knowledge, and what epistemic account on the genealogy of moral values is carried out to establish the point that moral value is generated in the same way as it is done in science and other naturalised discourses.²¹

The epistemic justification of morality reflects the moral knowledge of the person as a subject of lived experiences. This philosophy recognises that the human person cannot but develop the world he or she lives in. The human person is only to make his or herself known through the values of the environment and the morality he or she exercises in and through it. Any naturalised discourses are of great moral necessity, of needed moral judgement that has to do with the application of moral principles in concrete cases and situations. We socially assumed not only that morality was already experientially apprehended in its proper perspective, but also that it was intellectually objectified. Since the question asks about actions that are morally is.²² For the society morally sustained the conviction that human actions are located between moral principles and concrete situations.

As consequently put, moral life becomes a milieu where moral principles take on the social cognitive ability of the individual to actually expressed and realised to values of one's self-authenticity and self-subjectivity.²³ The *Acting Person* however, fulfils himself as a person in his or her specifically personal functions and abilities which are dependable on his or her moral rectitude to advance the society through reasonable, purposeful, creative and ethical thinking and values.²⁴ With rational cognitive domain, the *Acting Person* encounters natural determinations towards univocally defined actions for the purposes of attaining social order, peace and justice, the qualities that help him or her to achieve integral living and essence of development, In such domain the *Acting Person* is open-minded and reliable in truth, and loving toward the good.²⁵

As epistemologically recognised by many linguistic thinkers, within naturalised discourses on human-ecological linguistic classification and codification of development, the operational

¹⁹See Gbenga Fasiku, Moral Facts, Possible Moral Worlds and Naturalized Ethics. *West African Journal of Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 11, 2008, p. 83.

²⁰Karol Wojtyla, “The problem of the theory of morality”, p. 132.

²¹Gbenga Fasiku, Moral facts, Possible Moral Worlds and Naturalized Ethics, p. 83.

²²Karol Wojtyla, “The problem of the Theory of Morality”, p. 132.

²³M. F. Asiegbu, Objectivity necessary for moral judgment and the project of self-realisation. *West African Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 8, 2005, pp. 64-76, see, p. 70.

²⁴See, M. Krapiec, On the sources of natural law. *Dialectics and Humanism: The Polish Philosophical Quarterly*, XVII(2), 1990, pp. 237-243, see, p. 239.

²⁵Cf, M. Krapiec, On the sources of natural law, p. 239.

valuation of ethics is normatively regarded as science, and the understanding of science is situated on the fact that it takes interest in all facets of development that concern human understanding of lived experiences. The actual way for being ethical for the sake of human development is the person being sincere to any action he or she undertakes. The individual can only be ethical to this very self for being human when he or she is aware of himself or herself that knows. The knowledge the person has about himself or herself determines his or her goals and interests. The knowledge of the person cannot be distant from what the society provides for him or her.²⁶ The issues for the epistemic justification of morality are on the affirmative understanding that whether moral issues are facts or not. If there are moral facts, then, one can phenomenologically assert that morality can be epistemologically justified. If there is a possible world where human actions are either judged to be right or wrong ethically, such rightness or wrongness of actions is possibly in affirmative as fact in a possible world.

In possible world, knowledge is possibly claimed when facts are evidently established in line with the subject of knowledge. In social ethics, especially as a normative science, the subject of knowledge is the perpetrator of the act (whether moral or immoral, while the object of the moral fact is the victim, and the medium of the fact to be established is the act itself (determining the means and nature of the social and cultural acceptance of the act).²⁷ For the establishment of moral facts, we know from the means and nature of the moral actions, but they may be as mere moral assumptions. For “we know- or we think we know. It seems that more often than not the latter has tended to be the case in views of ethics. Even the psychology and sociology of morality have helped us see that this assumption was not entirely warranted.”²⁸ The human person knowing what to do as ethical practices presupposes that the individual as a subject of lived experiences is aware that such moral practices are highly implacable, and remain facts that can be subjected to future references.

Hence, we are asking about this especially when our question takes the form that goes still further (“what makes human actions morally good or evil ?”) and enters the realm of the basis of moral norm themselves (“why is what is morally good or evil that way?”) thus, not only do ethical question go beyond the simple question, “What is morality?” which must suggest itself to us in connection with the experience of morality, but they also, so to speak, “begin farther down the line.”²⁹ Naturally the human person as a subject of lived experience is eager from birth to death to know and discover what is unknown to him or her so as to have adequate information and knowledge to live conveniently in human society.³⁰ The establishment of this point should ordinarily provide a ground for accepting ethics as belonging to the naturalist family.³¹ Still, science cannot ignore questions that are less pressing from a vital or existential point of view, but not for the reason any less important from a scientific point of view. This applies in a special way to the question of the essence of morality, for this question.³² To put it

²⁶See, W. O. Aso, *Rudiments of Philosophy for Undergraduates*. Lagos: Fropiel, 2018, p. 36.

²⁷See, P. Valori, *L'esperienza Morale* (he Moral experience). Brescia, 1971, as in Dario Composta, *Moral philosophy and social ethics*. Bangalore: Theological Publication in India, 2000, pp. 1-2

²⁸Karol Wojtyla, “The problem of the Theory of Morality”, p. 132.

²⁹Karol Wojtyla, “The Problem of the Theory of Morality”, p. 132.

³⁰W. O. Aso, *Rudiments of Philosophy for Undergraduates*. Lagos: Fropiel Int'l Ltd, 2018, p. 36.

³¹Gbenga Fasiku, p. 90.

³²Karol Wojtyla, “The Problem of the Theory of morality”, p. 133.

another way, the question of the essence of morality ensures that the questions concerning moral good and evil are posed in a homogeneous way with respect to the experience of morality.³³ The experience of morality... allows us to come in contact with the essence of morality, and, in direct relation to this, the question arises, “what is morality?” in this question, we are seeking the intellectual objectification of that which is given in the experience of morality.³⁴

With morality, the social, religious, political, environmental and epistemological relevance of the human person can only use his or her natural heritage to the fullest when he or she realises the power of rationality, intelligibility and subjectivity, that if does not lose sight of the library of knowledge that has been left to him or her by generations past.³⁵ Thus, the theory of morality arises by means of knowledge of morality as the factor that accounts for the homogeneity of ethical knowledge.³⁶ Like the human brain, it is only useful if it integral and assessable exactly when it is needed.³⁷ The theory of morality, which is the most basic and comprehensive response possible to the question, “What is morality?” what should form the foundation of ethics? One preferably used the term *foundation* here not just in the sense of a substructure, but also in the sense of something that permeates a given structure “from the bottom up.” If we think of ethics as a structure should be permeated throughout by a proper theory of morality.³⁸ For the presence of morality is that of ethics, and no morality, no ethics, and vis-a-vis.

Hence, the epistemic justification of morality is based on the true knowledge of lived experiences being exercised through human actions and valued choices. It recognised that the issues of morality are always within the social projection of lived experiences. Such experiences are about the human person who stirs the wheel of developmental interests and ideologies determines the level of one's socialization and civilization by the contents of one's actions and valued choices. What is known to the human person is what the same human person uses as a hinge or basis for the designation of morality or the development of moral norms. This is the naturalised ethical projection of human experience, that is, an epistemic foundation of moral development. As socially put, the human person is a being of lived experiences that are rationally, ethically and intellectually classified. The moral necessity for such classification is epistemologically justified on the fact that “animals never become scientists. Only people do. And that is because they combine their universal ideas into sentences (propositions) which increase our human knowledge.”³⁹ Hence, the concept of “people” here, indicates or presupposes the establishment of knowledge that are socially or communally based, and the individual is ethically situated within the moral consciousness of the society he or she belong to, in trying to establish what is good or bad. Thereby, “morality

³³Karol Wojtyla, “The Problem of the Theory of Morality”, p. 133.

³⁴Karol Wojtyla, “The Problem of the Theory of Morality”, p. 133.

³⁵Thomas Odhiambo, “The Future of Biodiversity” In Jerome Binde (ed). *The Future of Value: 21st Century Talks*. Paris: UNESCO Publication, 2004, p. 209.

³⁶Karol Wojtyla, “The Problem of the Theory of Morality”, p. 133.

³⁷Thomas Odhiambo, “The future of biodiversity, p. 209.

³⁸Karol Wojtyla, “The Problem of the Theory of Morality.” In Karol Wojtyla, *Person and Community: Selected Essays*. Translated by Theresa Sandok. New York: Peter Lang, 1993, p. 133.

³⁹R. A. O'Donnell, *Hooked on Philosophy: Thomas Aquinas Made Easy*. NY: St Pauls, 1995, p. 2.

will have an essentially communal dimension and cannot simply be a question of individual matter.”⁴⁰

Acting Person and Epistemic Justification of Morality in the Paradox of Modern Self

Human person makes the discourses of morality possible. There are discourses on the values of morality for the development of the society because there are human persons to reason them out. Such interpretations of morality are based on what the human persons understood about their existential imports in relations to values of their actions and freedom. That is ethics. It is on this based that Karol Wojtyla phenomenologically asserted that, “the question, “What is morality?” is more directly related to the experience of morality and more plainly aimed at the interpretation of it. Normally, when we come in contact with any reality, the first question we ask: “What is it?” This is also true in the case of morality.”⁴¹ For Wojtyla, the social assessment of the phenomenology of the person as an acting agent of development, and as a being who regulates his or her world of experiences through his or her actions and valued choices is on the social interpolation of human morality and consciousness of a better life.⁴²

In achieving integral humanism, there are needs for epistemic justification of morality, and these needs should be situated on the will to determine whether an action is good or bad, right or wrong. It should be on the value of the human person who acts and on which an action is effected upon. With epistemic justification of morality, Wojtyla rejects any notion of merging the philosophy of consciousness with the philosophy of being, as the phenomenology of the person performs an ancillary function of choice making which is dependent on the experiential valuation of action. In all, the conditions for the operational belief of the epistemic justification of morality are dependent on the social application of moral reasoning, and which are about the conscious thinking on the values of the person for his or her beingness.⁴³ This “will provide a potent underpinning for the true and planetary ethics which the world now needs”⁴⁴ in validating the placements of the human person in acts of development. A world of the human person without ethics, necessarily for the provision of natural footing for human rights and dignity, with generate some senses of religiosity, perfecting the cultures of moral nihilism and relativism. In valuing ourselves as being of rationality and intelligibility, we find the indispensable reasons and qualities to necessarily activate and preserve the meaningful and creative imports of existence.

For Karol Wojtyla, the *Acting Person* as the modern self may perceive the epistemic justification of morality to be dependent on the operability of the *Culture of War* as he or she is driven by the negated morality of technological humanism rather the positive pursuance of the *Culture of Peace* orchestrated by the love for the integral humanism. Hence, the Paradox of the modern self demands that the epistemic justification of morality on the basis of the values of freedom and truth, on the interrelation of the faith and reason, remains the aspect of

⁴⁰L. Richard, *Is there a Christian Ethics?* New York: Paulist Press, 1988, p. 76

⁴¹Karol Wojtyla, “The Problem of the Theory of Morality”, p. 132.

⁴²K. Wojtyla, *The Acting Person*. Trans. by Andrej Potocki. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publ., 1979, p. 27.

⁴³Cf. P. O Isanbor and P. A. Edema, (2022), p. 29.

⁴⁴John Paul II, *Fides in Ratio*, no. 104.

philosophy and philosophical engagements that deal with the indispensable arguments about the values, worthiness of existence of oneself and its essential qualities of participation, dynamism and integration in relation to the lives of other person. It is about beauty of human togetherness in relation to the morality that makes it possible and sustainable. Otherwise, the human society will be drifting away by the values of scientific and technological humanism, which presents to the world that everything therein is of materialistic values, with no transcendental endings, and that future humanism should be sustained as such.

The epistemic justification of morality seats on the phenomenological affirmative of ethics as a normative science since moral actions can be epistemologically regarded as moral facts. This is because, experiences are facts, and since morality or moral action/event is an experience, then it can generate into a moral fact in order to affirm some level of social, cultural and scientific justification of such act or event. Though, many ethical questions are epistemologically raised to situate any such justification. Hence, “ethical questions – questions of the type, “what is morally good and what is morally evil in human actions? – Already in a way concern a subsequent issue. We are not asking in them about morality as such; we are not trying to understand the morality; rather, we are asking – on the basis of some previous understanding of morality- about a distinction fundamental to morality, the distinction between good and evil, and about the basis of this distinction.⁴⁵ Every moral question will be meaningfully answered when it corresponds with the moral facts available for such moral knowledge, and it is justifiable to be right or wrong in line with the content of such moral facts. This distinction (right or wrong, good or bad) is possible due to the fact that social status of morality is possible epistemologically, that is, the statue of morality is possible when the moral facts are possibly established.

Conclusion

Form the foregoing, we tried to related the fate of the Acting Person through the epistemic justification of his or her actions and valued choices, especially in the challenging paradoxes of the modern self as the moral agent of development. it demands that the understanding should be made that the *Acting Person* as a subject of lived experience, and he or she discovers true values of living and development neither by fashioning nor inventing them, but as product of natural law and reasoning. So the *Acting Person* in the paradox of modern self must be conscious of the values of morally justifying his or her action in order not to drift away from the operationality of the natural law. It is the true knowledge of morality that sustains human consciousness for the operationality of the natural law in human society. *Acting Person* should be should be conscious of the imposing nature of scientific and technological humanism which is trying to undermine the values of integral humanism. The former is centred on the development of the person as an object of experience while the latter sees the person as a subject of experience. This is the paradox of the modern self where the *Acting Person* is at the crossroad in evaluating what he or she do can for his or herself without due to reference for epistemic justification of morality in the oprationality of truth in right conscience and freedom. For all questions of morality should be readily adopted to on the values of the human person who can answer such questions, since he or she is the only being that question his or her

⁴⁵K. Wojtyla, “The Problem of the Theory of Morality”, p. 132.

very self. Since the value of the human person remains what it is in every culture, politics, creativity or innovation as a being of development, a subject of lived experiences and the agent of rational history, it behoves on him or her to act reasonably to develop the essence of being created.

Therefore, the relation between the *Acting Person* as a subject of lived experience and the epistemic justification of morality projects that the individual properly evaluates his or her actions and choices morally and responsibly before performing them. The *Acting Person* has to have proper knowledge of his or her actions and choices, for these actions and choices define the personality of the individual in the society. In all, morality is very the society where the individual lives. No economy, culture, religion, education or politics can hope to develop or grow where the human person has no sense of duty, the right attitude to work or labour and a sense of moral judgment and responsibility. The individual is expected tests a moral judgement against a moral fact that exists in all possible worlds, for the world may be deceptive with moral facts against the values and dictates of natural law. It is a fact because it is found in possible worlds, and there is no world in which its contrary is found, and it may be founded on the operationality of common sense. If, however, there is a possible world where it is justifiably shown that the moral fact does not exist, then the moral judgement would not correspond to any moral fact. Such a judgement is therefore false. Even when such correspondence of moral judgment and moral facts is achieved, it must be aligned with the values and operationality of natural law in order to achieved integral living in the society.

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