

EPISTEMIC IDENTITY AND GROUP KNOWLEDGE IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY

Etaoghene Paul Polo* & Olayinka Afeez Olanrewaju**

Abstract

Epistemic identity is the way an agent, individual or a collection of individuals is (are) disposed towards knowing and holding beliefs about the nature of knowledge. What constitutes knowledge for an agent is determined by the epistemic paradigms that guide the agent's acquisition and justification of what is real and what is not real. Researchers in African epistemology argue that there are indigenous ways of knowing, such as the testimony of elders, collective rationality, and sense experience. For them, these are genuine sources and justifications of knowledge, and they also form part and parcel of 'African epistemic identity.' They also argue that knowledge practice in Africa is grounded on African ontology, which explains the social and communitarian nature of African epistemology. To this end, this article explores the African epistemic identity, with particular attention on indigenous ways of knowing in African epistemology and collective agency. This article employs the expository, analytic, and dialectical methods to present an understanding of African epistemic identity through provision of useful insights on the social and communal character of African epistemology.

Keywords: Philosophy, Epistemology, Epistemic Identity, African Philosophy, Group Knowledge

Introduction

Just as western philosophers have done in western epistemology, African philosophers have situated their discourses on knowledge in the African setting. For instance, African epistemologists argue that in Africa, there are indigenous ways of knowing, all of which form part and parcel of 'African epistemic identity.' Particularly, the testimony of elders, collective rationality and sense experience have been regarded as genuine sources and justifications of knowledge in African epistemology. Beyond this, African epistemologists also opine that knowledge practice in Africa is grounded on African ontology, meaning that construction of knowledge in Africa is shaped by African beliefs, values and understanding of reality.

Furthermore, in African epistemology, a social and communitarian character is usually ascribed to knowledge, so that the African community as a whole is regarded as the primary bearer and justifier of knowledge. This simply means that knowledge in African epistemology is regarded as belonging to or shared by a group. In-view of this, this article, with particular focus on indigenous African ways of knowing and analysis of group knowledge (collective agency), establishes a comprehensive understanding of African epistemic identity, while providing useful insights on the social and communal character of knowledge in African epistemology.

Clarifying the Concept of 'Epistemic Identity'

In epistemology, knowledge forms a major theme. Little wonder, epistemology is widely construed as the study or theory of knowledge. As a theory of knowledge, epistemology "...deals with the analysis of sets of facts as principles that guide our understanding of issues that relate to knowledge" (Jimoh, 2013, 20). In addition, epistemology deals with ways of knowing and beliefs about the nature of knowledge (Caltabiano, Adam and Denham, 2019, 299). More so, epistemology focuses on questions as to what knowledge is, how knowledge can be acquired and verified, conditions that one must meet before he/she can be able to make a rightful claim to knowledge, and so on. Succinctly expressed, epistemology is the study of knowledge, focusing on questions about its nature, meaning, sources, scope, limits, types, creation, and distribution. It also examines how we come to know things and the certainty and reliability of our knowledge. At its core, epistemology centers on the concept of knowledge itself (Polo and Mordi, 2024).

In the context of this article, epistemology has an offspring term, namely 'epistemic.' That is, the latter is derived from epistemology, and it means "of or relating to knowledge" (Hazlett, 2016, 539-547). Thus, one uses the term 'epistemic' when he/she is talking about issues or facts relating to knowledge, such as the scope of knowledge, nature of knowledge, how knowledge is acquired, and so on.

By the term 'epistemic identity,' we basically refer to an individual's or a group's perception of how knowledge of oneself and of the world at large is enhanced. Put differently, epistemic identity

refers to “...dispositional ways of knowing and beliefs about the nature of knowledge that characterize an individual or group” (Caltabiano, Adam and Denham, 2019, 299). Again, epistemic identity means “...an identity that involves particular [knowledge-related] beliefs—for example, religious and political identities” (Byrd, 2022, 53) that are held by a person or group of persons.

From the above descriptions, we can comprehensively describe epistemic identity as the way an agent, individual or a collection of individuals is (are) disposed towards knowing and holding beliefs about the nature of knowledge. This simply means that what constitutes knowledge for an agent is determined by the epistemic paradigms that guide the agent’s acquisition and justification of what is real and what is not real.

More so, we can construe epistemic identity as the way a person or group of persons understand(s) the nature of knowledge, the means used to gain knowledge, the criteria for the assessment of the validity of knowledge, the purpose of the pursuit of knowledge, the role that knowledge plays in human existence, and so on.

African Epistemic Identity

At this juncture, it is apt to establish that the best way to comprehensively understand African epistemic identity is to reflect on two themes, namely: (1) indigenous ways of knowing recognised in African epistemology and (2) collective rationality (collective agency) or group knowledge. Consequently, the onus of this section is to expose the above-stated themes.

1. Indigenous African Ways of Knowing as African Epistemic Identity

In Western epistemology, there are generally recognised ways of knowing, all of which can be categorised under the large umbrellas of empiricism and rationalism. While empiricism is the view that human sensory experience is the source of all knowledge, rationalism is the view that knowledge of reality is derived from human reason (Wilburn, 2020). Similarly, some African epistemologists have argued that there are also established indigenous ways of knowing in African epistemology. Here, we shall consider the views of Mutombo Nkulu-N’Sengha and Gbari Usman Sylvester.

a. Mutombo Nkulu-N’Sengha: African Ways of Knowing and Cognitive Faculties

Mutombo Nkulu-N’Sengha (2005, 2) puts forth a tripartite categorisation of African ways of knowing, namely: (i) the supernatural, (ii) the natural, and (iii) the paranormal paths to knowledge, respectively.

(i) The Supernatural Path to Knowledge

According to Nkulu-N’Sengha (2005, 2), the supernatural path to knowledge is a cognitive mode in which “...human beings gain knowledge through the help of supernatural powers...” and it includes “...divination (*lubuko*, in the Kiluba language of the Congo) and revelation (i.e., messages revealed in dreams and visions)...” Put differently, the supernatural path to knowledge, in the view of Nkulu-N’Sengha (2005, 2), is exemplified in divination and revelation, both of which involve intervention of supernatural beings, such as spirits, ancestors, dead relatives, gods and goddesses, who pass knowledge to humans directly through dreams and visions, or indirectly through mediums, diviners, animals, extraordinary life events, or natural phenomena that necessitate some sort of interpretation.

(ii) The Natural Path to Knowledge

The natural path to knowledge is a cognitive mode in which human beings arrive at knowledge through the instrumentality of their natural faculties or abilities, which include intuition and reason (Nkulu-N’Sengha, 2005, 2). Intuition (*mucima* in Kiluba), in the view of Nkulu-N’Sengha (2005, 2), refers to the work of the human heart, which includes feeling and insight, while reason involves a natural investigation of reality through the human intellect and logical thought process. More so, it is noteworthy that Nkulu-N’Sengha (2005, 2-3) affirms that both intuition and reason are not mutually exclusive in Africa. This led him to recourse to using the phrase “African rationality” to refer to both intuition and reason.

(iii) The Paranormal Paths to Knowledge

The paranormal path to knowledge stands between the supernatural and natural paths to knowledge, and it is a mode of cognition or extrasensory perception (ESP), which is exemplified in clairvoyance and telepathy (Nkulu-N’Sengha, 2005, 3).

b. Gbari Usman Sylvester: Sources of Knowledge in the African Context

Gbari Usman Sylvester (2021, 180-184) avers that there are many ways to gain knowledge in Africa, such as (i) Sense or perceptual knowledge, (ii) common sense knowledge, (iii) Ancient (old age) /Elder's knowledge, (iv) Inferential knowledge, (v) Revelation/Mystical knowledge, (vi) Oral tradition, (vii) wholistic knowledge and (viii) Pragmatism.

(i) Sense or Perceptual Knowledge (Experience)

This is a kind of knowledge that is gained through instrumentality of the senses (Sylvester, 2021, 181). This, in the view of Ejikemeuwa (2014, 3), can also be called 'first-hand knowledge.' Ejikemeuwa (2014, 3) equally submits that this way of knowing is embedded on the idea of '*afun'anya e kwere*,' which translates in English as "to see is to believe." By extension, Ejikemeuwa (2014, 3) also avers that in Africa, it is widely held that knowledge is gained through what we see, hear, touch, taste or smell. This simply means that Africans are better disposed to believe what they have seen or witnessed, so that it is difficult to doubt whatever they have confirmed through their senses.

Sense experience therefore plays a key role in this cognitive process. For instance, the sentences: "Paul is at home" and "Luke is eating" both fall under sense or perceptual knowledge, since they can be empirically verified. Owing to the fact that this way of knowing is rooted on empirical verification, it necessarily becomes a means by which Africans acquire knowledge. One may want to argue here that the senses can be deceptive at times. Even though this is true, it still does not negate the importance of empirical verification in African epistemic practice. And besides, whenever there is difficulty in determining the genuineness of a claim to knowledge, Africans usually seek a third party, who was an eye-witness. The testimony of that individual, especially if he/she is elderly, is heavily relied on. And when the testimony of the eyewitness is doubted, Africans ultimately recourse to oath-taking (Sylvester, 2021, 181).

(ii) Common Sense Knowledge

Attainment of this kind of knowledge does not require any effort, as it is a kind of knowledge that is simply natural to the human person. Thus, all humans (including Africans), upon attaining the age of reason, are believed to be endowed with this kind of knowledge. A perfect instantiation of this kind of knowledge is the ability of a person to distinguish between what is morally good or morally bad (Sylvester, 2021, 181). However, it is noteworthy that "the fact that every person possesses this type of knowledge is in kind and not in degree," (Ejikemeuwa, 2014, 3), meaning that some persons have higher common sense than others, and vice versa.

(iii) Ancient (Old Age) /Elder's Knowledge

This kind of knowledge is based on African ontology. That is, the construction of knowledge here is shaped by Africans' beliefs, values and understanding of reality. Particularly, here, Africans usually hold that a person becomes more knowledgeable as he/she gets older and acquires a wealth of experience. Accordingly, an old person is believed to have had several experiences which constantly influence his/her decisions. More so, in the African hierarchy of beings, it is acknowledged that old people are more knowledgeable because they are closer to the gods/goddesses, who are considered the ultimate sources of all wisdom. Old persons in Africa are therefore believed to have an ontological status that presupposes knowledgeability (Sylvester, 2021, 182). This simply means that a person is believed to attain more knowledge and wisdom when he/she approaches divine wisdom. And a person approaches divine wisdom when he/she becomes less fleshy (Onyewuenyi, 1980, 312).

(iv) Inferential Knowledge

This cognitive mode (way of knowing) is based on inference from past experiences or events. It is important to note here that the African in his/her quest for knowledge usually tries to make reference to the past to enable him/her ascertain the present (Ejikemeuwa, 2014, 3). By inference, we refer to the act of arriving at a conclusion on the basis of a given data. In addition, "inferential knowledge is the type of knowledge gained from repeated events or phenomena" (Sylvester, 2021, 182). For instance, "if a little child says the truth once, twice or thrice, the African elder concludes that the little child is truthful" (Ejikemeuwa, 2014, 3).

(v) Revelation/Mystical Knowledge

This kind of knowledge is beyond sensory experience, as it is acquired through extra-ordinary means. Little wonder, Umontong (2002, 34), referring to the particular case of the Annang people of

Nigeria, states that mystical knowledge, being a major determinant of truth, is beyond an ordinary human being's understanding.

In this cognitive mode, knowledge is acquired through the help of gods/goddesses and other spiritual existences. Not every individual is able to access this kind of knowledge; only some privileged persons are able to access it, such as diviners, priests, native-doctors, witches, rain-makers, and so on (Sylvester, 2021, 182-183). Individuals in this category, as opined by Uduigwomen (2002, 38), are believed to possess certain "innate abilities" that enable them to manipulate the spirit world in favour of the natural world. As an *addendum*, Ekarika (1984) avers that this kind of knowledge involves getting information or truth about past and future things.

Amidst other facts, it should be noted that this type of knowledge is Africa's indigenous way of acquiring knowledge of realities that are not amenable to empirical verification (Ejikemeuwa, 2014, 3).

(vi) Oral Tradition

Words of mouth constitute the source of this knowledge. Oral tradition is the major means of knowledge acquisition and transmission in African traditional societies (Sylvester, 2021, 183-184). It involves a collection of events passed by one generation to another in form of proverbs, myths, stories, folktales, customs, legends, and so on (Ejikemeuwa, 2014, 3). Furthermore, Uduigwomen (2002, 39), citing Aja's view on oral tradition as a source of knowledge in African epistemology (Aja, 2008), states that oral tradition is also evident in works of arts, crafts, symbols, titles, names of places, shrines and sacred places.

(vii) Wholistic Knowledge

Africans believe that a person cannot attain knowledge of reality if he/she detaches him/herself from it (Anyanwu and Ruch, 1981, 94). The implication of this is that for knowledge of reality to be possible, there must be an encounter between the subject (knower) and the object (known). This is exactly what wholistic knowledge means in African epistemology. A connection therefore exists between an African and his/her world, so that an African cannot claim to know anything in isolation (Sylvester, 2021, 184).

(viii) Pragmatism

In very simple terms, pragmatism means 'activity,' 'practice' or 'action' (Rai and Lama, 2020, 1844). It involves 'learning by doing,' which is proven to be one of the surest ways of learning. For instance, to know how to drive, one must venture into the activity of driving. Like other humans elsewhere in the world, Africans learn by doing, as observable in activities such as craft, carving, farming and dying (Sylvester, 2021, 184).

It should be noted that the above are simply samples of African ways of knowing. There are other ways of knowing in Africa, which this article has not and will not discuss. For instance, we have Constatine Ngara's argument that "spirituality-centered thought and wisdom is a definite paradigm of knowing in Africa" (2007, 17, see also Nashon, Anderson and Wright, 2008, 1). Thus, this article does not claim to exhaustively account for indigenous African ways of knowing.

2. Collective Rationality (Collective Agency) or Group Knowledge: Social and Communitarian Nature of Knowledge in African Epistemology

In African epistemology, "collective rationality" also constitutes one of the ways of knowing. By collective rationality, we refer to "rational cooperation guided by collective reasoning: 'a cooperative effort, involving linguistic exchange, to answer a question or solve a problem confronting a group'" (Townley, 2008, 189). In the African context, the term 'collective rationality' does not simply imply that people think together. Its connotation goes beyond that. Rather, it implies a shared understanding that individual knowledge is not solely sufficient. For instance, in traditional African societies, elders regularly assemble to discuss issues affecting them. The decisions they arrive at in such meetings result from dialogue, sharing of wisdom, and consensus, and not from the views of a single individual. Undoubtedly, this communal process of communal decision-making values, respects and accommodates different perspectives, and is aimed at benefiting the entire community. As opined by Gyekye (1997), communal discussion is highly essential to the preservation of knowledge and moral values in African societies.

Moreover, the concept of collective rationality is pregnant with two different meanings. The first is ‘collective action,’ while the second is ‘collective reasoning’ (Townley, 2008, 189). In ‘collective action,’ collective rationality is construed as a form of group process that is aimed at arriving at a decision, and it is usually an aggregation of individual decisions. In ‘collective reasoning,’ collective rationality means a position or decision that is made by a collective entity. Here, the ‘rationality’ shows the position of a collective entity and indicates collective agreement. Essentially, both collective action and collective reasoning are geared towards realising a collective good (Townley, 2008, 189). This communal character of knowledge fosters societal harmony and unity. It also constitutes a system of checks and balances, where decisions and beliefs are critically considered in relation to shared experiences, ancestral teachings, and collective memory. African knowledge, as Oyeshile (2004) avers, emphasises the social context from which ideas are evolved, evaluated and transmitted. Knowledge, therefore, is not considered a private property but as a group possession that ought to meet communal interests. Here, the view is that knowledge should be used to improve human living conditions, promote justice, and maintain order in society.

As a way of knowing in African epistemology, collective rationality, therefore, refers to the entire process by which African communities come to know (identify and recognise) a collective action, a collective decision, a collective position or agreement that is aimed at fostering the well-being of everyone. From this exposition, it is clear that the collective rationality observable in African communities is what brings about group knowledge in Africa. That is, in African epistemology, group knowledge is exemplified in the collective rationality of Africans.

In furtherance, knowledge developed through collective rationality is usually transmitted orally and reinforced through cultural practices such rituals, public deliberations, and storytelling. These cultural expressions, apart from being methods of preserving knowledge, are also tools for instructing younger generations how to reason collectively. The assertion by Mbiti (1969) “I am because we are” suggests that in African societies, a person’s thought and knowledge are always shaped by their communal outlook, and this outlook buttresses the view that one cannot know in isolation or alone, and that truth is best discovered through group reflection.

Moreover, it is remarkable that the concept of group knowledge implies that a social and communitarian character is ascribed to knowledge in African epistemology, so that the African community as a whole is regarded as the primary bearer and justifier of knowledge. That is, knowledge in African epistemology is considered a social or communitarian phenomenon because it is regarded as belonging to or shared by Africans as a group.

Summarily, collective rationality is both a method and a philosophy of knowledge in African thought system. It influences the creation, judgment and distribution of knowledge. It also values ancient wisdom, and stresses unity over individual superiority. This is a sharp contrast to Western-oriented epistemic practices, which usually emphasise individual reasoning and objective detachment. In other words, African epistemology, which is rooted in the belief that knowledge is most meaningful when it arises from and serves the community, emphasises the subjective, cultural, and social dimensions of knowledge (Wiredu, 1996).

Summary and Conclusion

In a nutshell, the term ‘African epistemic identity’ simply refers to the way Africans are disposed towards knowing and holding beliefs about the nature of knowledge. Specifically, this article has established that the characteristic hallmarks of African epistemic identity are: (1) indigenous ways of knowing recognised in African epistemology, and (2) collective rationality (collective agency) or group knowledge. These two dimensions suggest that in the African worldview, knowledge is not merely about facts or individual reasoning but is deeply linked to experience, culture, and social responsibility. Indigenous ways of knowing, such as oral tradition, sense perception, elder’s wisdom, spiritual insight, and intuition, underscore a comprehensive understanding of reality. Similarly, collective rationality places so much value on group contributions, thereby fostering open dialogue, shared responsibility in the process of knowing, and consensus.

In conclusion, it should be noted that this article has simply attempted to establish what one may consider as the best way of understanding African epistemic identity. The approach taken in this paper should not be construed as a rigid framework but a foundation for appreciating how knowledge is viewed and handled in African societies. The expectation here is that the insights into African

epistemic identity provided in this paper will spur inclusive and respectful academic engagements between African and non-African philosophical traditions. More so, by appreciating the communal and culturally grounded nature of African epistemology, scholars may seek to start questioning the dominance of Western individualistic epistemic models and develop comprehensive understandings of knowledge.

Besides, this article does not in any way claim to have dealt with the subject matter exhaustively. Future ruminations could focus on the role of gender in African epistemic identity, the impact or influence of modernity and technology on indigenous ways of knowing, or the comparative value of collective knowledge in present-day global ethics and politics. African epistemology retains its status as a fertile domain for philosophical investigations, especially in a world where shared knowledge and collective wisdom are becoming highly relevant for tackling global problems.

ETAOGHENE PAUL POLO

Department of Philosophy, University of Delta, Agbor, Delta State, Nigeria

etaoghenepaulpolo@gmail.com

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0009-0001-1606-0273>

OLAYINKA AFEEZ OLANREWaju

Department of Philosophy, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria

olayinka.afeez17@gmail.com

References

- Aja, E., (2008). *Logic and Clear Thought: An Invitation to good reasoning*, 2nd ed. Enugu: University of Nigeria Press.
- Anyanwu, K. C., and Ruch, E. A., (1981), *African Philosophy: An Introduction to the Main Philosophical Trends in Contemporary Africa*. Rome: Catholic Book Agency – Officium Libri Catholic.
- Byrd, N., (2022). “Bounded Reflectivism and Epistemic Identity,” in *Metaphilosophy*, Volume 53, Issue1, Pages 53-69. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12534>.
- Caltabiano, M. L., Adam, R. J., & Denham, R., (2019). “Epistemic Identity and Undergraduate Students’ Understandings of Psychology,” in *International Journal of Education, Psychology and Counseling*, 4(30), 299-314. <http://www.ijepc.com/PDF/IJEP-2019-30-05-28.pdf>.
- Ejikemeuwa, J. O. N., (2014). “Nature and Function of Logic in African Epistemology,” in *IOSR Journal of Humanities And Social Science (IOSR-JHSS)*, Volume 19, Issue 11, Ver. V (Nov. 2014), PP 32-36, e-ISSN: 2279-0837, p-ISSN: 2279-0845. Doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.9790/0837-191153236>. Also available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/284453570_Nature_and_Function_of_Logic_in_African_Epistemology.
- Ekarike, J. P., (1984). *From Nature to Divine: An Introduction to the Study of Religions*. Italy.
- Gyekye, K., (1997). *Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hazlett, A., (2016). WHAT DOES “EPISTEMIC” MEAN? *Episteme*. 2016;13(4):539-547. doi:10.1017/epi.2016.29. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available at <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/what-does-epistemic-mean/1B92CF86D32968E01052CE27F448BB18>.
- Jimoh, A. K., (2013). *Certitude and Doubt: A Study Guide in Epistemology*. Ibadan: Ebony Books & Creations.
- Mbiti, J. S., (1969). *African Religions and Philosophy*. London: Heinemann.
- Nashon, S., Anderson, D., and Wright, H., (2008). “African Ways of Knowing, Worldviews and Pedagogy,” in Vol. 2 No. 2 (2007) of *Journal of Contemporary Issues in Education*. ISSN 1718-4770. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.20355/C59G66>. Available at <https://journals.library.ualberta.ca/jcie/index.php/JCIE/article/download/1026/693/376> 6.
- Accessed March 21, 2024.

- Ngara, C., (January, 2007). "African Ways of Knowing and Pedagogy Revisited," in *Journal of Contemporary Issues in Education*, 2(2):7-20, Doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.20355/C5301M>. Also available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228619332_African_Ways_of_Knowing_and_Pedagogy_Revisited.
- Nkulu-N'Sengha, M., (2005). "African Epistemology," in MolefiKete Asante & Ama Mazama(eds.), *Encyclopedia of Black Studies*. Sage Reference. Available at Omnilogos: <https://omnilogos.com/african-epistemology/#:~:text=African%20epistemology%20has%20eight%20major,rejection%20of%20the%20notions%20of%20%E2%80%9C>.
- Onyewuenyi, I., (1980) "Is There an African Philosophy?" in Claude Summer (ed.), *African Philosophy*. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press.
- Oyeshile, O. A., (2004). "Communalism and the Yoruba: A Philosophical Appraisal," in *African Identities*, 2(1), 103–118.
- Polo, E. P., and Mordi, J. F., (2024). "An Appraisal of Peter David Klein's Epistemological Infinitism (Scepticism and Infinite Regress)," in pages 114-126 of *AMAMIHE: Journal of Applied Philosophy*. ISSN: 597 – 0779. Volume 22, Issue 6 (December, 2024). DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.30371.98087. Available at <https://www.acjoi.org/index.php/ajap/article/view/6108/5907>.
- Rai, P. C., and Lama R., (2020). "Pragmatism and its contribution to Education," in *International Journal of Creative Research Thoughts (IJCRT)*. Volume 8, Issue 3 March 2020, ISSN: 2320-2882. Available at <https://ijcrt.org/papers/IJCRT2003258.pdf>.
- Sylvester, G. U. (2021). "Understanding the Relevance of African Epistemology for Development," pp. 174-191, in *African Indigenous Knowledge Systems: Problems and Perspectives*, A publication of The Association for the Promotion of African Studies, ISBN:978-978-979-501-7. Available at <https://acjoi.org/index.php/jassd/article/view/1503>.
- Townley, B., (July, 2008). "Collective rationality," Chapter 9, pp. 189–205 in *Reason's Neglect: Rationality and Organizing*. Oxford, online edition, Oxford Academic, October 3, 2011). Available at <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199298358.003.0009>. Accessed March 22, 2024.
- Uduigwomen, A. F. (ed.), (2002). *Footmarks on African Philosophy*. Lagos: Obaroh and Ogbinaka Publishers Ltd.
- Umotong, I. D., (2002). "Truth: A Philosophical Reflection on Africa," *Sophia: African Journal of Philosophy*, Vol 2. No. 2, pp 25– 39.
- Wilburn, H., (2020). "An Introduction to Western Epistemology," in *Philosophical Thought Unit 3: Epistemology*. Available at <https://open.library.okstate.edu/introphilosophy/chapter/an-introduction-to-western-epistemology/>. Accessed March 21, 2024.
- Wiredu, K., (1996). *Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.