

IMPLICATIONS OF JOSEPH RAZ'S VALUE AND MORAL PLURALISM ON NIGERIA LEGAL SYSTEM

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Abstract

This study analyses the philosophical contributions of Joseph Raz, specifically his concepts of value and moral pluralism, and their ramifications for Nigeria's intricate legal system. Focussing on Raz's ideas about value pluralism, his idea of authority as a service, and his idea of practical normativity, findings show that these ideas when applied to Nigeria's overlapping legal systems and competing normative systems can elucidate the difficulties confronting Nigeria's pluralistic legal framework. The research contends that although Raz's value pluralism provides useful tools for comprehending and managing normative diversity, considerable theoretical modifications are essential to address Nigeria's distinctive colonial heritage, indigenous customs, and constitutional ambitions. Using the analytical and theoretical method of analysis, the study recommends that Raz's moral philosophy, when appropriately contextualised, can enhance the development of more sophisticated approaches to legal pluralism in Nigeria, while honouring both constitutional principles and cultural diversity.

Keywords: Value Pluralism, Pluralism, Legal System, Constitutionalism and Normativism

Introduction

Joseph Raz's value pluralism arises from his overarching philosophical endeavour to comprehend the essence of practical reason and its function in human agency and well-being. In contrast to philosophers who view value theory as a separate area of moral philosophy, Raz incorporates his comprehension of values into a holistic framework of practical reasoning that includes moral, prudential, and aesthetic dimensions within a cohesive theoretical structure. This synthesis enables him to advocate for value pluralism while asserting that practical reasoning can be objective and that rational selection among conflicting values is feasible, even when those values are incommensurable.¹

¹. Joseph Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) 369-429.

Nigeria's religious diversity makes its normative landscape complicated. Nigeria must deal with competing religious claims about moral authority and proper government authority, because it has about the same number of Christians and Muslims and a lot of people who practise traditional African religions.² The acknowledgement of Sharia law in northern Nigeria illustrates this religious plurality while simultaneously generating conflicts with constitutional guarantees of individual rights and religious liberty. These tensions have sometimes led to violence, which shows how hard it is to create inclusive ways of governing in societies with many different religions.

The fundamental issue in this study is that legal pluralism in Nigeria is limited in the theoretical frameworks that describes its legitimate authority. The Constitution acknowledges customary law as a legitimate legal source, but it simultaneously imposes the "repugnancy doctrine" on customary practices, rendering those practices invalid if they are considered inconsistent with natural justice, equity, and good conscience. Thus, the constitution of Nigeria at the same time recognises and rejects moral/legal pluralism.

Philosophical Perspectives of Value Pluralism: from Ancient to Contemporary

The initial philosophical enquiries into value plurality originate from ancient Greek philosophy, where thinkers contended with discord among divergent notions of the good life and moral superiority. *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* offered one of the earliest comprehensive analyses of value complexity, recognising that human flourishing (eudaimonia) can be attained through diverse forms of excellence and that various virtues may sometimes be in conflict.³ His examination of practical wisdom (phronesis) acknowledged that moral decision-making frequently necessitates contextual judgement that cannot be simplified to the mechanical application of universal principles—an understanding that foreshadows subsequent pluralist apprehensions regarding the constraints of systematic moral theory.

Thomas Aquinas formulated a more systematic framework for value plurality in his integration of Aristotelian philosophy and Christian theology. In his *Summa Theologica*, his exposition of natural law acknowledged that individuals seek diverse goods such as life, knowledge, companionship, recreation, aesthetic appreciation, and religious commitment that align with distinct facets of human nature.⁴ Aquinas contended that these goods were incommensurable, meaning they could not be quantified by a singular standard.

². Pade Badru, "Imperialism and Ethnic Politics in Nigeria," in *Imperialism and Ethnic Politics in Nigeria* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1998), 45-67.

³. Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics*. Translated by Terence Irwin. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1999.

⁴. Thomas Aquinas. *Summa Theologica*. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947; John Finnis. *Natural Law and Natural Rights*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

David Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature*, presented a paramount early modern challenge to systematic moral theory. His well-known saying that "reason is, and should only be the slave of the passions" implied that moral judgements were based on feelings rather than logical proof, which made people less sure that objective moral knowledge was possible.⁵ Hume's acknowledgement of the influence of custom and tradition on moral sentiments foreshadowed a comprehension of moral diversity that would subsequently impact anthropological and sociological perspectives on cultural variation.

Immanuel Kant's, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, constituted a significant endeavour to re-establish the feasibility of objective moral knowledge via his categorical imperative and the concept of moral duty rooted in rational autonomy.⁶ Kant's systematic approach also showed how universal moral principles can clash with specific cultural contexts and personal situations. In his later political writings, especially *Towards Perpetual Peace*, he recognised the validity of cultural diversity while asserting that universal principles of justice could establish a foundation for harmonious coexistence among diverse populations.⁷

John Stuart Mill's utilitarian philosophy faced considerable difficulties in tackling value plurality, especially in his efforts to differentiate between higher and lower pleasures and his acknowledgement of the significance of individual liberty and cultural diversity.⁸ In his work *On Liberty*, he said that people and cultures could have different ideas about what makes a good life as long as they didn't hurt anyone else.

Friedrich Nietzsche on *the Genealogy of Morals*, gave a critique of conventional moral, which subsequently influenced later pluralist arguments.⁹ His assertion that conventional moral categories embody specific historical and cultural viewpoints rather than universal truths fostered scepticism regarding the feasibility of universal moral knowledge.

⁵. David Hume. *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.

⁶. Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*. Translated by Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997; Christine M. Korsgaard. *Creating the Kingdom of Ends*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

⁷. Immanuel Kant. "Toward Perpetual Peace." Translated by Mary Gregor. In *Practical Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; Martha C. Nussbaum. "Kant and Cosmopolitanism." In *Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal*, edited by James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997.

⁸. John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*. In *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, edited by John M. Robson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977; *Utilitarianism* in *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, edited by John M. Robson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977.

⁹. Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1967; *Beyond Good and Evil*. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1966.

John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* was a complex effort to create systematic principles of justice that could accept legitimate value diversity while also giving clear direction to political institutions. In his later work on *political liberalism*, he took this idea even further, saying that "public reason" should be used to justify political institutions instead of controversial metaphysical and religious ideas.¹⁰

Ronald Dworkin's interpretive theory of law in his work, *Law Empire* constitutes a highly advanced endeavour to integrate moral considerations into legal theory.¹¹ Dworkin's faith in the potential for legal determinacy is partially contingent upon his conviction in the ultimate coherence of moral and political values, a conviction that value pluralists would contest. This tension between interpretive legal theory and value pluralism is still not well understood in the legal literature.

The Overview and Development of Nigerian Constitutional Framework

The evolution of Nigeria's constitutional framework has been influenced by continuous efforts to reconcile the nation's normative diversity while preserving national unity and consistent governance strategies. During the colonial period, the basic framework of legal pluralism was established by recognising both English common law and indigenous customary law. However, this recognition was always hierarchical, with colonial courts applying English legal standards having the power to supervise and potentially override customary law.¹²

The independence constitution of Nigeria tried to fix some of the problems with the colonial legal system by making customary and religious law clearer while keeping the basic idea of legal pluralism. But the political instability that marked Nigeria's early years of independence made it impossible for stable institutions to form that could handle normative diversity well.¹³ The civil war from 1967 to 1970 and the military governments that followed made it even harder for the constitution to grow and caused long-lasting tensions about how national unity and regional diversity should work together. The return to civilian rule in 1979 marked the start of more organised efforts to create constitutional frameworks that could handle Nigeria's diversity. The 1979 Constitution had clearer rules about customary law and set up federal character principles to make sure that Nigeria's diversity was shown in government institutions. These principle of federal character, continued till the 1999 constitution which was only an enhanced version of the

¹⁰. John Rawls, *Political Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993; Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, edited by Erin Kelly. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001.

¹¹. Ronald Dworkin, *Law's Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 87-113.

¹². A.N. Allott, "The Judicial Ascertainment of Customary Law in British Africa," *Modern Law Review* 20, no. 3 (1957): 244-263.

¹³. Billy Dudley, *An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 78-134.

1979 constitution. However, the 1999 constitution still maintained the "repugnancy doctrine", which explains the existence of the contradiction till date and a need to fashion a legal framework where legal pluralism is better enshrined in the Nigerian constitution and the contradictions explained.

Contextualizing Value-Moral Pluralism and Practical Reason in Raz

Joseph Raz's path to creating his own unique ideas about value and moral pluralism started when he was a student at Oxford University, where he was taught by H.L.A. Hart. At first, Raz was interested in legal positivism and the structure of legal systems. Over time, he became more interested in bigger issues like practical reason and the basis of normativity. These ideas eventually led him to his mature theory of value pluralism.

Raz's pluralism is based on how he looks at the connection between reasons and values. According to him, values are not autonomous entities existing separately from human practices and institutions; instead, they are integrated within the social structures and relationships that define human existence. To quote him, "the existence of different kinds of good depends on the existence of social forms."¹⁴ However, this social embeddedness of value does not lead Raz to relativism, as he asserts that certain social forms possess objective superiority over others and that the values inherent in social practices are amenable to rational critique and assessment.

In Raz's viewpoint, the concept of value incommensurability constitutes one of his most unique contributions to moral philosophy. His interpretation of incommensurability suggests that while different values can be compared, they cannot be ranked on a singular, comprehensive scale that facilitates a mechanical resolution of value conflicts.¹⁵ The lack of a universal metric does not preclude the potential for rational selection among incommensurable alternatives; however, it indicates that such decisions require practical judgement that cannot be simplified to algorithmic computation.

This comprehension of incommensurability bears significant ramifications for moral education and practical wisdom. If values are occasionally incommensurable, then moral education cannot merely involve the acquisition of rules or methodologies for determining correct responses to moral enquiries. Moral education should cultivate the ability for practical judgement, allowing individuals to navigate conflicting values while being attuned to the specific circumstances of their situation, all while adhering to objective criteria concerning human flourishing and well-being.¹⁶

¹⁴. Ibid., 309.

¹⁵. Ibid., 322-357.

¹⁶. Joseph Raz, "The Role of Well-Being," *Philosophical Perspectives* 18 (2004): 269-294.

Raz's pluralism also talks about how values and human agency are related. Values do not exist in isolation from human activities and relationships; rather, they are manifested through the effective engagement in significant projects and obligations. This means that different people can legitimately pursue different value configurations based on their circumstances, abilities, and commitments, but they are still bound by objective limits on what constitutes real human flourishing.¹⁷ This viewpoint enables Raz to recognise diversity in valuable lifestyles while asserting that not all lifestyles possess equal value. Part of the philosophical importance of Raz's work is that he systematically defends the idea of objective pluralism. Critics of value pluralism frequently contend that recognising the incommensurability of values inevitably results in relativism or subjectivism regarding moral judgement.¹⁸

Raz's exposition of practical reason underpins his advocacy for objective moral judgement within a pluralistic context. Raz formulates an advanced framework that integrates both cognitive and motivational aspects of practical reasoning, distinguishing it from purely cognitivist theories that regard moral judgement as predominantly a knowledge issue, and purely non-cognitivist theories that view it as primarily an attitude or emotional concern, all while preserving the objectivity of moral judgement.¹⁹

His examination of the structure of reasons uncovers significant complexities that affect the comprehension of moral conflict and moral judgement. He makes a distinction between first-order reasons, which directly support certain actions, and second-order reasons, which are reasons about reasons.²⁰ Exclusionary reasons are a specific category of second-order reasons that eliminate certain first-order reasons from consideration, rather than merely outweighing them.

Value pluralism posits that constitutional interpretation cannot occur merely through the application of abstract principles, neglecting the specific social and cultural contexts in which constitutional provisions must function. The interpretation and implementation of constitutional principles, including equality, liberty, and democratic governance, may differ based on the social structures and cultural traditions in which they are situated.²¹ This contextual method of constitutional interpretation necessitates a nuanced comprehension of various cultural traditions and their perspectives on essential issues of political morality.

¹⁷. Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, 369-395.

¹⁸. John Kekes, *The Morality of Pluralism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 45-89.

¹⁹. Joseph Raz, *From Normativity to Responsibility* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 23-79.

²⁰. Joseph Raz, *Practical Reason and Norms*, 35-84.

²¹. *Ibid.*, 189-216.

Critique of Joseph Raz' Moral and Value Pluralism

Joseph Raz's value pluralism, while theoretically intricate and practically illuminating, has faced considerable critique from philosophers of various traditions who contest its coherence, implications, and sufficiency in addressing the challenges it claims to resolve. These criticisms encompass fundamental challenges to the feasibility of objective value pluralism, as well as more particular apprehensions regarding the practical ramifications of Raz's framework for moral reasoning, and cultural diversity.

One of the most common criticisms of Raz's value pluralism is that it does not make sense to hold both value incommensurability and moral objectivity at the same time. Critics such as John Kekes assert that Raz's endeavour to maintain moral objectivity while recognising authentic value conflicts results in an unstable theoretical framework that ultimately disintegrates into either monism or relativism.²² They argue that if values are truly objective, there must exist facts regarding their relative significance that facilitate systematic ranking, thereby rendering incommensurability claims implausible. On the other hand, if values are truly incommensurable, assertions regarding their objectivity lose significance, as there would be no factual foundation for favouring one value configuration over another.

Ronald Dworkin has worked the hardest on this coherence problem. He says that cases of value incommensurability that seem clear-cut can always be solved by more advanced moral analysis that uncovers principles that can order competing values.²³ Dworkin's criticism suggests that Raz's incommensurability thesis is based on theoretical flaws rather than real moral features. Dworkin contends that proficient moral reasoning, informed by interpretive methodology, can invariably discern "right answers" to moral enquiries.

Legal philosophers have articulated apprehensions regarding the ramifications of Raz's value pluralism for legal theory and practice. Brian Leiter asserts that Raz's perspective on normative diversity engenders significant challenges in comprehending the interplay between law and morality.²⁴ Leiter posits that if values are genuinely incommensurable, then the moral assessment of legal systems becomes problematically indeterminate, potentially undermining the critical role that moral philosophy ought to fulfil in relation to legal institutions.

Jeremy Waldron has criticised Raz's approach to legal authority for not paying enough attention

²² John Kekes. *The Morality of Pluralism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993; *Against Liberalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997, p.96

²³ Ronald Dworkin. "Do Liberal Values Conflict?" In *The Legacy of Isaiah Berlin*, edited by Mark Lilla. New York: New York Review Books, 2001; *Justice for Hedgehogs*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011, 107

²⁴ Brian Leiter. "Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered." *Ethics* 111, no. 2 (2001): 278-301; "Marx, Law, Ideology, Legal Positivism." *Virginia Law Review* 101, no. 4 (2015): 1179-1200.

to the democratic foundations of legitimate law in modern societies. Waldron says that Raz's service conception, while giving sophisticated tools for judging the functional capacity of legal authorities, ignores important democratic values that must be included in any good theory of legal legitimacy.²⁵ This critique indicates that Raz's framework may be insufficient for comprehending legal authority in democratic societies marked by profound discord regarding political values.

Matthew Kramer has expressed apprehensions regarding the ramifications of Raz's value pluralism on constitutional interpretation and judicial reasoning. Kramer contends that if constitutional values are truly incommensurable, then constitutional interpretation becomes intolerably indeterminate, thereby jeopardising the rule of law values that constitutional frameworks are intended to safeguard.²⁶ This critique indicates that Raz's framework might be inherently self-defeating in the context of constitutional adjudication.

These reactions have elicited significant responses from Raz and his proponents, resulting in persistent debates regarding the sufficiency of value pluralist frameworks in moral and political philosophy. Raz has addressed coherence criticisms by formulating more precise explanations of the relationship between value objectivity and incommensurability. He contends that his critics conflate various forms of value comparison and fail to recognise the specific way values can be objective without being entirely commensurable.

Joseph Chan and George Crowder are two people who supported Raz's approach. They argue that most of the criticisms are based on misconception of Raz's position or unreasonable expectations about what a theory of value pluralism should do; that Raz's framework gives us enough tools for practical reasoning and moral evaluation while also recognising the complexity of moral life that more systematic approaches tend to hide.

Nonetheless, these persistent debates underscore the enduring difficulties faced by Raz's value pluralism, especially concerning its practical implementation in scenarios such as Nigeria's legal pluralism, where theoretical complexity must be integrated with institutional efficacy and cultural awareness. The criticisms examined indicate that although Raz's framework offers valuable perspectives on the complexities of normative diversity, considerable theoretical advancement may be necessary to meet the distinct needs of legal pluralism in postcolonial contexts.

²⁵. Jeremy Waldron. *Law and Disagreement*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999; "The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review." *Yale Law Journal* 115, no. 6 (2006): 1346-1406.

²⁶. Matthew H. Kramer. "How Moral Principles Can Enter into the Law." *Legal Theory* 6, no. 1 (2000): 83-108; *Objectivity and the Rule of Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Implications of Raz's Value Pluralism to Nigeria's Legal System

The Nigeria constitutional framework currently utilises a hierarchical structure in which statutory law prevails over customary law, both of which are subordinate to constitutional supremacy. Conflicts are addressed through the application of the repugnancy doctrine.²⁷ However, this hierarchical model frequently fails to encapsulate the authentic value conflicts inherent in legal pluralism and may unwarrantedly undermine significant aspects of traditional legal systems.

Raz's perspective on value incommensurability indicates that conflicts among various legal systems may occasionally embody authentic value conflicts that cannot be reconciled through straightforward hierarchical ordering. For example, the difference between customary law's focus on restorative justice and community harmony and statutory law's focus on individual rights and deterrent punishment may show a deeper conflict between values that can't be compared, not just a simple fight between better and worse legal systems.²⁸ Acknowledging this incommensurability does not obviate the necessity for pragmatic resolution of legal disputes; rather, it indicates that such resolution should be pursued through contextual evaluation rather than the rigid application of hierarchical regulations.

The practical ramifications of this approach are evident in domains such as family law, where tensions frequently emerge between traditional marriage customs and legal marriage stipulations. Instead of just using the repugnancy doctrine to throw out customary practices that do not follow the law, courts could do a more in-depth analysis that takes into account the valid values in both legal systems.²⁹ Customary marriage practices may reflect significant values including community participation in family formation, intergenerational continuity, and cultural identity, whereas statutory marriage requirements may represent values such as gender equality, individual autonomy, and state acknowledgement of legal relationships.

Raz's framework posits that the resolution of such conflicts necessitates meticulous consideration of the unique circumstances of each case and the distinct manners in which varying values are either upheld or jeopardised by diverse legal methodologies. This may necessitate the formulation of "contextual accommodation"—strategies aimed at safeguarding the fundamental principles of various legal systems while identifying pragmatic solutions that mitigate value erosion.³⁰ For instance, courts might come up with ways to interpret the law that recognise customary marriages as valid while still requiring certain legal protections for women's rights,

²⁷. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, Sections 1(3) and 315.

²⁸. T.O. Elias, *The Nature of African Customary Law* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956), 287-312.

²⁹. *Mojekwu v. Mojekwu* (1997) 7 NWLR (Pt. 512) 283.

³⁰. Abdulmumini Adebayo Oba, "Religious and Customary Laws in Nigeria," *Emory International Law Review* 25, no. 2 (2011): 881-895.

instead of just throwing out customary practices that don't meet all legal requirements.

Nigeria's constitutional framework poses significant challenges for value pluralist approaches, as constitutional interpretation generally necessitates definitive legal resolutions, even in instances of intricate value conflicts. The Constitution acknowledges legal pluralism via its stipulations on customary and Sharia law, while concurrently instituting hierarchical relationships through supremacy clauses and fundamental rights provisions.³¹ This leads to ongoing disagreements about how to interpret the Constitution when its values clash with those of other legal systems.

Raz's value pluralism provides tools for creating more nuanced methods of constitutional interpretation that can recognise real value conflicts while keeping the constitution consistent. Constitutional interpretation should not regard constitutional rights as absolute overrides of competing values; instead, it should utilise "practical reasoning," as described by Raz, to consider the entire spectrum of values involved in specific cases.³² This method would acknowledge that constitutional principles like equality and personal freedom are inherently valuable, yet not universally comparable to all other values in every situation.

This approach can be practically demonstrated by examining the conflicts between constitutional rights provisions and religious or customary law. For instance, tensions between women's constitutional rights to equality and specific customary inheritance practices may be examined through contextual analysis aimed at finding methods to advance gender equality while maintaining beneficial aspects of traditional inheritance systems.³³ This could entail formulating interpretive frameworks that differentiate between traditional practices that systematically oppress women and those that represent alternative yet potentially valid methods of familial relationships and property allocation.

This kind of approach would need an interpretation of the Constitution that takes cultural context into account while still upholding constitutional values. This marks a substantial divergence from both rigid formalist methodologies that apply constitutional rules in a mechanical fashion and entirely relativist frameworks that uncritically adhere to established traditions.³⁴ It proposes the cultivation of "constitutional dialogue" between constitutional principles and alternative normative traditions—strategies that regard both constitutional obligations and conventional values with seriousness while pursuing pragmatic solutions that respect both. This approach has institutional consequences that include questions about judicial review and how constitutional

³¹. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, Chapter IV.

³². Raz, *From Normativity to Responsibility*, 23-79.

³³. Ukeje v. Ukeje (2014) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1418) 384.

³⁴. Chukwudi Anthony Obiora, "Bridges and Barricades: Rethinking Polemics and Intransigence in the Campaign Against Female Circumcision," *Case Western Reserve Law Review* 47, no. 2 (1997): 275-378.

courts work with other legal institutions. Constitutional courts functioning within this paradigm must cultivate novel forms of expertise that integrate legal analysis with cultural comprehension and ethical reasoning.³⁵

Conclusion

Raz's value pluralism provides significant resources for comprehending and tackling the issues of legal pluralism in Nigeria. His acknowledgement of value incommensurability establishes a theoretical basis for honouring the diversity of normative traditions while circumventing both reductive monism and uncritical relativism. His service conception of authority provides advanced instruments for assessing conflicting assertions of legitimate authority, focussing on their genuine ability to serve their constituents rather than merely their formal acknowledgement or customary standing. His comprehension of practical reason offers frameworks for moral judgement that can adeptly navigate intricate value conflicts while upholding a commitment to objectivity and rational assessment.

The research underscores the significance of analytic investigation in comprehending the practical functioning of various legal systems and their impact on diverse populations. The study concludes that Joseph Raz's ideas about moral and value pluralism cannot be directly used to solve Nigeria's complicated legal problems. However, his advanced philosophical framework gives us useful ideas that can help us come up with more nuanced and effective ways to deal with legal pluralism when they are properly adapted and combined with knowledge of the situation. The essential factor is not merely the application of Western theories to non-Western contexts, but rather a substantive dialogue between theoretical frameworks and practical realities that can enhance both our comprehension and our ability to take effective action in confronting the normative challenges of diverse societies.

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³⁵ Nkeonye Otakpor, "Judicial Review and Constitutional Interpretation in Nigeria," *African Journal of Legal Studies* 7, no. 3 (2014): 234-267.

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