

HATE SPEECH AND ITS POTENTIAL TO RE-IGNITING RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN KADUNA AND PLATEAU

NABIBI MONDAY

University of Jos

&

DAUDA ABUBAKAR

University of Jos

ABSTRACT

The persistent dissemination of hate speech by religious leaders on social media poses a significant threat to Christians-Muslims relations in Kaduna and Plateau States. Although recent developments suggest an improvement in interreligious relations, the increasing prevalence of hate speech presents the potential to reigniting religious conflicts in Kaduna and Plateau states. Despite this, little is known about the role of religious leaders in disseminating hate speech on social media. This paper aims to examine the prevalence of hate speech and its potential to reigniting religious conflicts in Kaduna and Plateau, presenting a cautionary signal for Christian-Muslim relations. The paper adopted a qualitative approach, utilizing both primary and secondary data sources. Content analysis was also used to analyse the content of hate speeches by religious leaders on social media. Findings reveal that religious leaders are major actors in spreading hate speech on social media, which fuels resentment and hostility between Christians and Muslims. The hate speech presents the potential to reigniting religious conflicts in Kaduna and Plateau. The paper concluded that, despite the current state of improved Christian-Muslim relations, relative peace, and mutual trust among adherents of both faiths in Kaduna and Plateau, the spread of hate speech threatens to undermine these gains. Unless religious leaders desist from propagating hate, there is a risk of reigniting the violent religious conflicts that have plagued the states in the past. The paper recommends that government authorities should enact and enforce laws to penalize religious leaders who incite hatred through social media.

KEYWORDS: Hate Speech, Reigniting, Religious Conflicts, Kaduna, and Plateau.

INTRODUCTION

Hate speech constitutes a significant threat to peace and development in Nigeria, particularly in the northern region, where it often contributes to violent conflicts, especially in Kaduna and Plateau. These conflicts have severely damaged intergroup relationships, particularly between Christians and Muslims, and have undermined

socioeconomic progress in the affected areas. Peace is a catalyst for sustainable development; in its presence, businesses flourish, livelihood opportunities expand, and citizens feel secure in pursuing their daily endeavours (Abubakar 219; Turaki 133).

Kaduna and Plateau are religiously diverse cities, predominantly inhabited by Christians and Muslims. However, over the past two decades, these communities have experienced recurring conflicts that have strained interreligious relations and hindered development. The rise in hate speech, whether along ethnic, religious, or political lines, has further fuelled anger, prejudice, stereotypes, and hostility between the two religious communities (Abdu 123; Yabiliyok 64). While the intensity of conflict varies between the two locations, the city of Jos witnessed a prolonged period of violent crises from 2001 to 2010. These events left a legacy of destruction: numerous lives were lost, properties destroyed, businesses and schools closed, and marketplaces abandoned. The aftermath of these crises includes broken Christian-Muslim relations, economic paralysis, and stalled development (Ozhalan 63; Onah 2).

This paper explored the role of hate speech as a driving force behind religious conflicts in Northern Nigeria, with specific attention to Kaduna and Plateau States. The aim is to examine the increasing prevalence of hate speech as a warning signal for potential religious conflict between Christians and Muslims. The focus is on how hate speech, particularly on social media, is used by both Christian and Muslim actors in Kaduna and Plateau.

There appears to be a gap in existing literature regarding the direct link between hate speech and the escalation of tension, suspicion, and eventual violent conflict between adherents of Christianity and Islam in these regions. Today, Christians and Muslims in Kaduna and Plateau often live apart, with mutual distrust, bitterness, and hostility remaining prevalent (Yabiliyok 123). Although many scholars have analysed the causes of conflict in these areas, often attributing them to ethnicity, religion, politics, or economic struggles, the role of hate speech in intensifying these tensions has not received adequate scholarly attention (Onah 18; Nguvugher 62; Turaki 63, 122). This study argued that hate speech is a significant but underexplored source of conflict in Northern Nigeria. It adopted a qualitative research approach, which facilitates the collection and analysis of both primary and secondary data. Primary data were obtained through interviews, while secondary data were gathered from academic journals, textbooks, newspapers, and credible internet sources.

PERCEPTIONS OF HATE SPEECH IN KADUNA AND PLATEAU

Human beings are naturally inclined to relate with one another and form associations. However, these relationships are often shaped by the motivations, perceptions, and environments that individuals are exposed to. Social interactions are dynamic and can shift based on differences in origin, worldview, beliefs, and personal

principles. People are more likely to associate closely with others who share similar perspectives (Joel 16). Conversely, they may withdraw from or even develop hostility toward those perceived as different. These perceived differences, whether in religion, ethnicity, political ideology, or cultural values, can become fertile ground for hatred and exclusion, eventually manifesting in hate speech (Turaki 77).

For instance, a person may find it difficult to relate to another because of differences in skin colour, ethnic background, or religious beliefs. A person from the Igbo ethnic group may choose to avoid or even despise someone from the Yoruba or Hausa ethnic groups, just as a Bajju man might resist marrying a woman from the Kaivi ethnic group, not because of a lack of beauty or virtue, but simply due to ethnic difference (Okolie 135). Such examples illustrate that difference, whether perceived or actual, is a major trigger of hate speech. When individuals or groups define themselves in opposition to others, it becomes easier to justify hostility, leading to the normalization of hateful narratives (Eziebe 17; Ozhalan 31).

This section outlines three key forms of perceptions that commonly trigger hate speech among Christians and Muslims in Kaduna and Plateau:

Subjugation of the “Other”

Subjugation refers to the marginalization or relegation of certain individuals or groups, rendering them less important, especially in matters of governance and social inclusion. It often manifests as an imbalance in political representation, public appointments, and employment opportunities. This form of exclusion tends to be driven by ethnic or religious sentiments.

For instance, in Kaduna State, under Governor Nasir Ahmad El-Rufai, out of eighteen commissioners, only one was a Christian from 2019 to 2023, and only three are Christians from 2023 to 2025, under Governor Uba Sani. Similarly, in Plateau State, only three Muslims were commissioners from 2019 to 2025 out of seventeen commissioners, while the rest are Christians. Such disparities in political appointments reflect a systemic imbalance and are often interpreted as religious bias. These patterns of marginalization are common across several northern states, where majority groups dominate governance structures, often at the expense of minority communities (Adesoji 96; Okolie 118).

This deliberate sidelining of minorities despite their competence and capacity to contribute meaningfully has been described as parochial and nepotistic (Mary John 6; BBC). The resulting sense of exclusion fosters resentment and fuels hate speech, especially among the marginalized. It reinforces anger and frustration among those who are marginalised. In expressing their feelings, they mostly use derogatory speech like wicked people, Azalumai (people seeking to dominate others, etc.). These utterances often escalate into incitement and violence, further destabilizing peaceful coexistence

(Ojo 117; Adesoji 97). This ongoing marginalization is one of the drivers behind movements like the *Jasawa agitation* in Plateau State and the *Gurara State* proposal from Southern Kaduna. The grievances are deeply rooted in long-standing prejudice, stereotyping, and division that have historically characterized the political and religious landscape of Nigeria's North-Western and North-Central regions (Abubakar 232).

Religious Persecution and Zealotry

Religious persecution can also be described as religious fanaticism, an extreme and often hostile expression of religious identity. It involves an unyielding belief in the superiority of one's religion, often accompanied by disdain or outright hostility toward other religions. Umar Danfulani defines religious fanaticism as a negative and vicious attitude, characterized by exaggeration, manipulation, exploitation, and sometimes violence (Danfulani 19).

Fanaticism manifests in various ways, including verbal attacks and the suppression of others' rights to religious freedom. Despite Nigeria's constitutional guarantee of religious liberty, some individuals and communities actively suppress or demean other faiths simply because they differ from their own. In both Kaduna and Plateau States, derogatory labels are frequently used by Christians and Muslims to describe each other. These include terms such as "*arna*", "*kafirai*", "*masu buga goshi da kasa*", "*Malos*", "*fitinanu*", "*zuriyar Yahudawa*", "*marasa kaciya*", "*masu fitsari a tsaye*", and "*kazamai*" (Nguvugher 117; Yabiliyok 25).

Such inflammatory language reduces the self-worth of the targeted individuals or groups, creates fear, and incites anger. It fosters religious intolerance, defined as the inability or unwillingness to accept the existence and practices of other religions. Driven by bias and prejudice, individuals may make utterances that are deeply offensive to others' religious beliefs and practices. As Nkechi Onah notes, hate speech often sets the stage for religious violence in Nigeria (19). Though Nigeria is constitutionally a secular state, the promotion of one religion as superior to others is unconstitutional and dangerous. Religious zealotry, when combined with hate speech, poses a grave threat to stability and peaceful coexistence in Kaduna.

Pursuit of Dominance

Human beings are inherently social and political, seeking recognition, control, power, and material wealth. When these ambitions are unmet, some individuals or groups may resort to desperate measures, including hate speech, to attain influence or dominance. This is particularly evident during political campaigns and elections in Nigeria. During electoral cycles, politicians and their supporters frequently deploy hate speech to delegitimize opponents and mobilize support along religious or ethnic lines. These divisive strategies not only discredit political rivals but also deepen existing

religious and ethnic divides among the electorate. Hate speech is thus weaponized to win votes, often leaving a trail of hostility among ordinary citizens who become emotionally inclined (Onah 19-20; Okolie 119).

This was evident during the 2011 post-election violence in Kaduna and other parts of Northern Nigeria, where politically motivated hate speeches led to widespread unrest (Onah 20). Similarly, during the 2015 presidential elections, both the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressives Congress (APC) extensively used hate speeches to vilify each other. It can be argued that hate speech was one of the key tools used by the then-opposition party (APC) to unseat the ruling party (PDP) (Onah 22; Ojo 119). Hate speech in this context is not only derogatory and divisive, but it also becomes a powerful tool for incitement. It deepens political and religious fault lines and often leads to instability and violence, especially in politically sensitive regions such as Kaduna and Plateau States (Adesoji 98).

MANIFESTATIONS OF HATE SPEECH BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND ITS POTENTIAL OF REIGNITING RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN KADUNA AND PLATEAU

This section employed content analysis to examine hate speeches made by religious leaders on Facebook, a platform where a significant amount of hate speech is perpetrated. While both Christian and Muslim adherents are active participants in online hate speech, their actions are often heavily influenced by the rhetoric of their religious leaders. These leaders frequently use their social media platforms to disseminate inflammatory messages during sermons (*hudubas*) or teachings, particularly on matters involving religion and national politics.

Given the high regard that adherents of both faiths accord to their religious leaders, followers are often quick to consume and echo such sentiments, sometimes more aggressively to demonstrate loyalty to their religious identity. As a result, it shapes their attitudes and behaviours towards the other in physical interactions. Therefore, they mostly think evil and speak hate speeches against the others, which often escalate the situation, frequently sparking tensions that can spill over into physical confrontations between Christian and Muslim communities (Abubakar 227).

This paper documents several instances as examples in which religious leaders have made inflammatory posts on Facebook, especially while commenting on sensitive national issues. The religious leaders were selected strictly from those who recite and have many followers within Kaduna and Plateau. One notable instance involved a Muslim cleric who criticized the rising cost of the Hajj pilgrimage, comparing it under the administration of President Asiwaju Ahmed Tinubu (a Muslim) to that under former President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan (a Christian). Despite the significant increase in

Hajj fares occurring during President Muhammadu Buhari's tenure (also a Muslim), the cleric attributed the trend to Jonathan, referring to him with the derogatory term *arne* (pagan).

In expressing outrage over the Hajj fare increase from ₦4 million to ₦8.5 million as of March 2024, the cleric accused the current Muslim-led administration of waging a "crusade" against Islam, a claim he argued had begun under the Christian former president (Facebook post). This inflammatory statement quickly generated backlash in the comment section, as both Christian and Muslim users began exchanging insults. Comments included personal attacks such as *uwarka ce arniya* (your mother is the pagan), *kaine arne ba Jonathan ba* (you are the pagan, not Jonathan), and *uwarka da ubanka su ne arna* (your mother and father are the pagans). In a video associated with the post, a visibly angered Christian woman was heard responding: "*Ka ji shege, kaine arne ba Jonathan ba*" (You wretch, you're the pagan, not Jonathan) (Facebook post).

Such reactions demonstrate how quickly hate speech from religious figures can incite emotional and hostile responses from followers of both faiths. Not only does this threaten peaceful coexistence, but it also undermines the perceived moral authority and credibility of religious leaders, especially among members of the opposite faith. When religious leaders express bigotry, they legitimize it among followers, creating a cycle of radicalization and mistrust. This dynamic is clearly visible in the history of inter-religious conflicts in Nigeria, where religious rhetoric has contributed to unrest in areas like Kaduna and Plateau (Ezeibe et al 96; Turaki 172).

When religious leaders target political figures who enjoy widespread support, their comments often provoke retaliatory insults from the politician's admirers. These interactions further polarize communities and risk inflaming pre-existing religious and ethnic divisions (Abubakar 11). The authors observed that in many of these online interactions, religious identity becomes a defining factor in how users respond. Names, which often signal religious or ethnic affiliation in Nigeria, were used by followers to align themselves either in defence of or opposition to the religious leader in question.

Another example involves a prominent religious leader who referred to Christians in Plateau State as *arnan Jos* (the pagans of Jos) while commenting on state politics. This derogatory label triggered widespread condemnation not only of the cleric himself but of Muslims more broadly within the region. Many Christians perceived his statement as divisive and inflammatory, which may have contributed to political losses for the cleric's preferred candidate during the 2023 gubernatorial elections. In response, a Christian clergyman issued a counterattack on social media, labelling the Muslim cleric as *arne* (pagan) and accusing him of stoking religious tensions: *Kaine mai hada fada da fitina har da yaki a Filato* (you are the one fuelling conflict and war on the Plateau), followed by a course that *in Allah ya yarda shekaran nan za ta yi maka daci* (God's willing, this year will be bitter for you) (Facebook post).

The Christian clergyman further accused Muslims broadly of sponsoring terrorism in Plateau State, an inflammatory generalization that deepened the religious animosity. A Christian woman also responded online with emotional outrage, using similar derogatory language in defence of her faith and community. In turn, another influential Muslim cleric reacted harshly, referring to Christians collectively as *arna* and labelling the woman a prostitute. He called upon his followers to defend Islam and religious leaders by using social media to counterattack Christians with similar derogatory language (Facebook post).

The sermons and social media rhetoric of the renowned religious leaders seem troubling from the standpoint of religious harmony, civic responsibility, and the ethics of public speech, especially by the religious leaders representing the major religious groups in Kaduna and Plateau. The remarks not only perpetuate religious antagonism but also pose real dangers to Christian-Muslim relations and peaceful coexistence in multi-religious states like Kaduna and Plateau. This reveals a dangerous pattern of weaponizing religion, inflammatory, derogatory, and explicitly sectarian comments, using derogatory language that can incite anger and intensify conflict, because such statements also undermine any prospect for peace building or mutual respect among Christians and Muslims.

CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM RELATIONS AND THEIR AMELIORATING STATES IN KADUNA AND PLATEAU

This section argues that Christian-Muslim relations are improving significantly in Kaduna and Plateau. Following the past occurrences of violent conflict and their devastating impacts on Christian-Muslim relations, economic development, and social stability in Kaduna and Plateau states, there appears to be a gradual improvement. There is observable progress in interreligious interaction with increasing signs of mutual trust and cooperation in various spheres of life. In both Kaduna and Jos, Christians and Muslims now interact more freely and cordially in public spaces such as markets, schools, hospitals, and financial institutions. Muslim traders, for instance, can now comfortably conduct business in predominant Christian areas such as Anguwan Rukuba, Rukuba Road, Etobaba, Fraka, and Lamingo (Yabiliyok 89; Abubakar 31).

While Christian-Muslim relations are steadily improving with promising prospects for long-term peace, the continued dissemination of hate speech, particularly by religious leaders on social media, poses a significant threat. These "warning drums" of hate speech have the potential to reignite old tensions, provoke bitterness, and unravel the fragile peace currently being experienced.

An interview with Kabiru Isma'il, a Muslim who sells yams on a wheelbarrow in Anguwan Rukuba, Etobaba, and Odus axis in Jos, reveals the extent of this improved relationship. He stated: I am a Muslim, but I enjoy doing business with the Christian

customers. I often visit their shops and homes freely because there is peace. I can move around their areas without fear. Sometimes, Christian customers even give me cooked food (Interview).

Similarly, Lawal Isyaku, another Muslim trader, affirmed that Peace has been improving rapidly on the Plateau, despite occasional skirmishes. As a Muslim, I often visit Christian areas like Rukuba Road and Utan without any form of harassment. I interact freely with Christians and even stay in their areas up to 7pm or 8pm without fear before returning home (Interview). These accounts highlight a renewed sense of trust and communal coexistence. Muslim traders now entrust goods to Christian customers on credit without fear of betrayal, and such mutual confidence reflects deepening peace in Jos and its environs.

In the same vein, Christians now carry out their business activities in Muslim-dominated areas such as Anguwan Rogo, Dilimi, Rikkos, Bauchi Road, Congo Rosha, and Gangare without fear or restriction. Mama Esther, a Christian businesswoman who roasts and sells maize in Gangare, a Muslim-majority area, shared her experience that I live around Tina Junction, but I enjoy coming to Gangare to do business because the Muslims treat me well and never violate my rights. Sometimes I leave around 9 pm or 10pm, and no one has ever harassed or intimidated me. Even when some customers don't have money, they take maize on credit and pay later, and I've never had any problems (Interview). Additionally, both Christians and Muslims now support each other during life events. In cases of illness or bereavement, members of both faiths visit one another in hospitals and homes. During weddings and celebrations, they also exchange greetings and show solidarity. These gestures of social integration demonstrate a gradual return to peace and interfaith harmony in Kaduna and Plateau States.

It is important to note that such interactions were nearly impossible in the past. For example, during the 2021 Jos crisis, many Christians were killed in Muslim-dominated areas. As a result, some Christians referred to areas like Gadan Bako in Gangare as *Kogin Pasha* (Persian River), a metaphor for danger and death (Abubakar 214; Yabiliyok 6). The fact that these perceptions are now shifting speaks volumes about the progress being made. However, the continuous propagation of hate speech, especially on social media platforms, threatens to undermine these hard-won gains. The rhetoric of division, often subtle and emotional, can reawaken past grievances and incite fresh hostility, especially among youth and radical adherents. Therefore, while peace appears to be returning, hate speech remains a dangerous undercurrent capable of destabilizing interreligious harmony if not urgently addressed.

In the same way that Christians previously feared entering Muslim-dominated areas, many Muslims were also unable to access places such as Anguwan Rukuba, Etobaba, and Rukuba Road. These areas were commonly referred to by Muslims as

rijiyar mutuwa (wells of death) due to the numerous incidents during the 2021 Jos crisis, in which many Muslims were reportedly killed and their bodies dumped into abandoned wells. This deep sense of trauma is echoed by Dauda Chentu, who describes religiously dominated areas in Plateau State as *Jerusalems* and *Istanbuls*, symbolizing religious and ethnic enclaves that perpetuate division and suspicion (Nguvugher 62).

Nevertheless, with time, there are signs of healing. Relationships are gradually being restored, and economic activities have resumed. Businesses are thriving once again, and these positive developments reflect a hopeful shift toward peace and reconciliation. Such experiences should be actively encouraged and supported by all stakeholders, such as government, religious leaders, civil society, and local communities, to ensure the full restoration of peace in Kaduna and Plateau States. The revival of Plateau State as the "Home of Peace and Tourism" and Kaduna as a centre of peaceful coexistence and liberal learning depends largely on sustaining this fragile peace.

Despite these signs of progress, there is growing concern over the resurgence of hate speech, especially on social media. Christians and Muslims appear to be gradually forgetting the painful memories of lost loved ones and destroyed property, particularly during the Kaduna 2011 and Jos 2021 crises. This perceived amnesia is evidenced by the rising frequency of hate-filled messages being shared by members of both faiths, often with the involvement of religious leaders. The situation is made more alarming by the active role some religious leaders now play on social media platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, and X (formerly Twitter). While social media offers an opportunity for religious leaders to reach broader audiences and share teachings, it is increasingly being misused as a platform for incitement. During their sermons or teachings, some religious leaders resort to inflammatory, divisive, and derogatory comments that vilify the beliefs and practices of other religions. These messages stir resentment, deepen existing tensions, and threaten the fragile peace in Kaduna and Plateau (Ozahlan 54; Eziebe 9).

Although love, mutual respect, and social interaction appear to be returning to Christian-Muslim relations in both cities, there remain subtle yet significant traces of fear, anxiety, and distrust. The scars of conflict have not completely healed, and mutual trust has not been fully restored. What progress has been made is now being endangered by the continued spread of hate speech, particularly when it comes from religious authorities whose influence over followers is profound. In essence, while peace may be visible on the surface, the foundations of Christian-Muslim relations in Kaduna and Plateau remain fragile. Underlying tensions persist, and communities still tend to live at a distance from each other, geographically and socially. These divisions are observable in everyday spaces such as markets, schools, hospitals, and financial institutions, where interactions, though improving, are still marked by caution.

This reality underscores the argument that the rising rate of hate speech, especially from religious leaders in Kaduna and Plateau States, acts as a warning drum, signalling that the states may once again be treading a dangerous path. If left unaddressed, this trend could reignite the same conflicts that previously tore communities apart (Joel 3). It is, therefore, crucial for this paper to examine specific instances of hate speech perpetrated by religious leaders, as these continue to pose a serious threat to Christian-Muslim relations and the broader peace efforts in Kaduna and Plateau.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper has argued that hate speech significantly intensifies dismay in Christian and Muslim relations and exacerbates conflicts between them in Kaduna and Plateau states. The involvement of religious leaders in propagating such speech often mobilizes their followers either consciously or unconsciously to engage in retaliatory or supportive reactions. Typically, supporters of the hate speech tend to belong to the same religion as the speaker, while opposition generally comes from adherents of different faiths. This pattern underlines the deepening polarization along religious lines.

The escalating rate of hate speech in Kaduna and Plateau states poses a serious threat to the fragile peace and the ongoing efforts to rebuild strong relationships between Christian and Muslim communities. Hate speech not only undermines social cohesion but also damages economic activities and religious harmony, thereby impeding broader development within these states.

This paper recommends the following for major stakeholders, and by implementing these recommendations, stakeholders can collectively work towards sustaining peace, rebuilding trust, and ensuring the long-term social and economic development of Northern Nigeria.

1. Religious leaders should take conscious steps to cease the dissemination of hate speech. Instead, they should emphasize messages of mutual love, respect, and tolerance to foster peaceful coexistence. Religious leaders must refrain from amplifying divisive rhetoric on social media platforms.
2. Social media platforms must actively regulate hate speech by monitoring content, promptly deleting inflammatory comments, and holding perpetrators accountable according to established policies. This will help curb the spread of harmful speech and its potentially violent consequences.
3. Government authorities should enact robust constitutional legislation specifically targeting hate speech. Measurable sanctions and enforcement mechanisms should be developed to deter individuals, especially influential religious figures, from engaging in speech that threatens peace and stability in Kaduna and Plateau states.

WORKS CITED

- Abdu, Hussaini. "Ethno-religious conflict in Kaduna: Impact on women and children." In *Ethno-Religious Conflict and Democracy in Nigeria: Challenges*, edited by Etannibi E. O. Alemika and Festus Okoye, 117-142. Kaduna State, Nigeria: Human Rights Monitor, 2002.
- Abubakar, Dauda. "Alliances between Religious Leaders and Politicians in Nigeria: A Challenge for Sustainable Development". *Towards Peace, Security and Sustainable Development in Africa*. Media Team, IT Educational Publishers, 2014. 213-232.
- Abubakar, Salihu, and Hafsat Aliyu. *Social Media Ethics and Misinformation among Islamic Studies Students in Kaduna State*. ResearchGate, Sept. 2024.
- Adesoji, Abimbola. "The Politics of Hate Speech in Nigeria: A Critical Review." *Journal of African Media Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2020, 95–112.
- BBC. *How Fake News Fueled Jos Killings*. BBC Africa, 2018, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa.
- Ezeibe C. & Ikeanyibe O.M. "Ethnic politics, hate speech, and access to political power in Nigeria." *Africa Today*, Vol. 63, No.4, 2017 65–83. <https://doi.org/10.2979/africatoday.63.4.04>.
- Ezeibe, C. "Hate Speech and Election Violence in Nigeria." *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 2020, 1–17. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909620951208>.
- Gimes Ashafa. <https://www.facebook.com/share/12FtkCz9XSi/2025>.
- Isiya City Boy Isiya <https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61552927229486> accessed 2024.
- Joel, Jennifer. *Ethnopolism and Ethno-Religious Hate Speech in Nigeria. Enabling policies for Responding to Hate Speech practice*. 2012.
- John, K. Mary. Assessment of Hate Speech on Social Media: The Danger and Crime Universal Scientific Bulletin (USB) Vol. 6, 1, 2023.
- Moujahide Kaidai Kaga Mutum, <https://www.facebook.com/share/v/15UMuTg1xz/2025>.
- Nguvugher, Dauda Chentu. "Istanbuls and Jerusalems in Jos: A Perspective of the Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Jos, Nigeria". *SWEM Journal of Religion and Philosophy*. Vol. 4, no. 2, 2014. 62-77.
- Nguvugher, Dauda Chentu. *Conflicting Christologies in a Context of Conflicts: Jesus, the Isawa and Christian-Muslim Relations in Nigeria*. Africa Christian Textbooks (ACTS), 2010.
- Ojo, Emmanuel, and Akinwale, Ademola. "Hate Speech, Governance and the Challenges of National Integration in Nigeria." *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, vol. 13, no. 4, 2019, pp. 117–128.

- Okolie, Rasaq, et al. "Ethno-Religious Hate Speeches and Political Violence in Nigeria's Fourth Republic." *RUDN Journal of Public Administration*, vol. 9, No. 2, 2022, 133–144.
- Onah, G. Nkechi, Innocent A. Ugwu, Favour C. Uroko. "Hate Speech and Ethno-religious Conflicts in Nigeria: Implications for Political Stability." *MAHABBA: Journal of Religion and Education*, Vol. 2, No. 2. 2021. Doi:1047135/mahbbah.v2i2.31
- Ozarslan, Z. Introducing two new terms into the literature of hate speech: "Hate Discourse "and" Hate Speech Act" Application of "speech act theory" into hate speech studies in the era of Web 2.0. *Ileti-s-im*, 2014. Vol. 20, 53-75.
- Shittu, Huud. Editor. *Hate Speech Syndrome and Implications on Contemporary Nigeria*. Publications of Nigerian University Scholars in Religion (NUSREL), 2019.
- Turaki, Yusufu. *Historical Roots of Ethno-Religious Crises and Conflicts in Northern Nigeria*. Challenge Press, 2010.
- Yabiliyok, A. Jonathan. *Interreligious Education in Africa: Religious Education for Promoting Christian-Muslim Relations in Kaduna*. Paulines Publications Africa, 2021.