AQUINO Journal of Philosophy

This article critically examines Onora O’Neill’s philosophical account of consent and respect for persons, situating her work within the Kantian tradition and contemporary moral discourse. O’Neill reconceptualizes consent as a morally substantive practice rather than a mere procedural formality, emphasizing conditions of competence, voluntariness, and adequate information. By linking consent to the ethical principle of respect for persons, she highlights the relational and context-sensitive nature of moral obligations, challenging reductive libertarian or individualist models of autonomy. The analysis explores how O’Neill’s framework operationalizes respect for persons across ethical, political, and global contexts, including medical practice, policy-making, and international justice. Through a philosophical lens, the article demonstrates that respect for persons entails recognizing their agency, protecting their dignity, and ensuring that moral and institutional practices do not undermine their capacity for self-determination. Furthermore, the discussion engages with critiques regarding cultural relativism, the tension between universal moral principles and situational ethics, and potential limitations in addressing structural inequalities. By bridging rigorous Kantian moral theory with practical ethical concerns, O’Neill provides a normative foundation for contemporary debates on autonomy, human rights, and moral responsibility. The article concludes that integrating consent and respect as central moral imperatives offers both theoretical clarity and practical guidance for ethical decision-making in personal, institutional, and global spheres. This approach reinforces the moral significance of recognizing persons as ends-in-themselves and underscores the necessity of operationalizing ethical principles in ways that are socially, politically, and morally coherent.

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