EKPOMA REVIEW

The sense of a possible moral world projects some developmental and social monitoring of human activities through the languages the individuals employ to express them. Such activities demand to be good in constituting social order, justice, and peace. This is possible when human freedom is put under the operation and application of the ethics of living for the realization of integral human development. This is against the notation of human development inherent in Ayer's emotivism as a moral theory. In emotivism, human freedom is erroneously and adequately maximized without recourses to the necessity of common social and moral facts that exist in a possible moral world. Such possible moral facts in the moral world help to checkmate human activities and some unguided exercises of freedom. This paper aims at critiquing Ayer's emotivism as a moral theory by recognizing that there are moral facts that can be socially and linguistically expressed to establish and sustain moral order. At such, it posits that no society can be ordered, just, and peaceful when every human individual is allowed to exercise his or her freedom or carry out any activity at will, based on personal moral conviction and directive as Ayer's emotivistic theory suggests, without recourses to common moral and ethical facts or principles inherent in a possible moral world. The paper concludes that proper moral development of the human person cannot be achieved in a human society that so desires social order and probity, due to the moral relativistic tendencies it presents to the human society.

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