HANNAH ARENDT’S BANALITY OF EVIL AND THE SILENCE OF THE ACCUSED
This study examines the silence of corruption‑accused subordinates through the lens of Hannah Arendt’s banality of evil, merging social‑political philosophy with the philosophy of law. The central problem is that current legal frameworks across multiple jurisdictions treat an accused’s silence as either a protected right against self‑incrimination or, at most, a tactical choice. Drawing on Arendt’s analysis of Adolf Eichmann and subsequent scholarship on bureaucratic thoughtlessness, the study argues that, much of this silence is neither strategic nor innocent: it is the symptomatic expression of thoughtlessness, a culpable failure of reflective judgment that arises from uncritical obedience to leaders. The study solves this problem by proposing a novel evidentiary framework that distinguishes tactical silence from banal silence, allowing courts in corruption trials to draw adverse inferences when the accused’s vacant, repetitive or role‑bound responses signal an authentic inability to think about the meaning of his or her actions. Key findings include the identification of Arendtian thoughtlessness as a distinct mental state not captured by existing mens rea categories, and the demonstration that standard interrogation protocols across common law systems, implicitly presume a rational actor who simply chooses to remain mute. The study recommends legislative amendments to anti‑corruption statutes, judicial directions on banality‑informed inferences, and a specialised interrogation protocol for investigators. It concludes that holding the banal subordinate accountable does not violate the right to silence but rather gives that right a more precise, context‑sensitive meaning within systemic corruption cases.
Keywords: Banality of evil; Thoughtlessness; Silence of the accused; Corruption; Philosophy of Law.