This paper examines the role of epistemic trust and testimony in the circulation and acceptance of fake news in Nigeria, using empirical and philosophical analysis. The evidence combines questionnaire responses with five Focus Group Discussions involving 40 participants across Anambra, Enugu, Abia, Ebonyi and Imo States. The findings show that respondents do not treat all information sources as epistemically equivalent. Professional journalists attracted the strongest average trust (48.1% agreeing or strongly agreeing that they are credible), followed by factchecking organisations (37.0%) and academic experts (29.6%), while social-media influencers attracted only 7.4% and government information 22.2%. Yet the qualitative findings show that familiarity, reputation, interpersonal relationships, professional appearance, photographs, videos, perceived authority and repeated circulation can make information appear credible. The paper argues that trust is both indispensable and dangerous: indispensable because individuals cannot independently verify everything they know, and dangerous because misplaced trust can transfer credibility from a messenger to a proposition without adequate evidential support. Repetition creates a further problem when multiple appearances of a claim are mistaken for independent corroboration. The analysis connects these findings with the epistemology of testimony, reliabilism, epistemic authority and social epistemology. It proposes calibrated epistemic trust, based on competence, sincerity, relevant expertise, reliability, track record, transparency, corroboration and provenance. The paper concludes that responsible information practice requires asking not only who communicated a claim but where the material originated, when it was produced, whether it has been altered and whether apparent agreement represents independent confirmation.
Keywords: Fake News; Epistemology; Belief; Justification; Verification; Nigeria; Social Epistemology