AN EVALUATION OF MORAL DECISION MAKING IN JOSEPH FLETCHER
This paper is an evaluation of Joseph Fletcher's approach on making moral decisions. Joseph Fletcher's theory of Situation Ethics proposes a distinctive model of moral decision making grounded in the primacy of agapeic love as the sole normative principle. This paper critically examines Fletcher's account of moral reasoning, focusing on its philosophical foundations and implications for ethical judgment. By rejecting both legalistic rule-based morality and antinomian arbitrariness, Fletcher advances a contextualist approach in which moral rightness is determined by the demands of concrete situations. The study analyzes Fletcher's six fundamental principles and four working principles as a coherent framework for ethical deliberation. It further evaluates the philosophical strengths of this approach, including its emphasis on practical reasoning, moral responsibility, and sensitivity to human circumstances, while engaging with major ethical objections such as moral relativism, subjectivism, and the erosion of universal moral norms. Using analytical, hermeneutical and evaluative methods, the paper argues that despite these criticisms, Fletcher's model contributes significantly to contemporary ethical theory by offering a nuanced account of moral decision making that mediates between absolutism and relativism.
Keywords: Joseph Fletcher, Moral, Decision-Making, Situation Ethics, Implications.