To a great degree of validity, it can be postulated along Heideggerian pattern of reasoning that being human inevitably means being an entity that sometimes experiences disease-conditionsinitslifetime. This implies that the absence of such possibilityrenders individuals nonhuman.Indeed, it wouldalso be inappropriate to conceive them as living organisms, for it is in the general structure of the organisms to stand the chance of being so afflicted sometimes.And the chance forms one of the factors that causeindividuals toappreciatethe finitudeof their existenceas it takes them close toanother fact of life, which is death. Death hovers aroundevery ailing individual and becomes the possible difference between their seeking-for, responding and not responding to clinical treatments.Given individuals’realisation of the finitude of their lives as a consequence of disease affliction, it is typical of them to evaluate their moral livesduring illnessespecially with respect to how best or worst they had related with fellow individuals and the environment. With the assessment,sometimes,comes a desire to survive so as to amend their moral approaches, especially where they adjudge themselves reprehensible.That amendment,sometimes,involves desiring tobe more benevolent than malevolent; creating a humane society. This is because it dawns on diseased-individuals that life is short, nasty and vain. Hence, it is more meaningful to be benevolentthan alreadylived. This essay deploys analytic method of philosophic discourses to explore human disease-condition as a stimulus fora new moral order in society.
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