Child poverty remains one of the most persistent and morally troubling realities of contemporary Nigerian society. Conventional approaches interpret child poverty largely through economic lenses, emphasising income deprivation, but such perspectives fail to capture the deeper moral and structural dimensions of the problem. This paper argues that child poverty in Nigeria should be understood not merely as an economic deficiency but as a form of structural moral injustice. Drawing on John Rawls' theory of justice, the capabilities approach developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, and African communitarian perspectives on personhood and social responsibility, the study develops a philosophical framework for understanding child poverty as a systematic violation of human dignity and fundamental capabilities. It contends that children occupy a distinctive moral position characterised by dependency, vulnerability, and non-responsibility for their circumstances, imposing heightened obligations on families, communities, and the state, and demonstrates that corruption, governance failures, structural inequality, and inadequate public investment have driven the persistence of child poverty in Nigeria. The study concludes that addressing child poverty requires structural transformation rooted in justice, accountability, and the protection of children's capabilities, rather than welfare interventions alone.
Keywords: Child poverty, structural injustice, human dignity, capabilities approach, social justice, Nigeria, childhood vulnerability