A DISCOURSE ON CONSTRUCTIVISM IN RONALD DWORKIN’S JURISPRUDENCE

The current focus of legal debate is the proper role of the courts in the interpretation of statues and the constitution. Are judges to look at naked language of enactments, or to decide otherwise in their applications to cases? This paper examines Ronald Dworkin’s constructive interpretation of pre existences legal statues. The aim of this research is to discourse the constructivism in Dworkin’s jurisprudence. Objectively, this paper would (a) emphasis on Dworkin’s notion on law, (b) it would expose Dworkin’s constructivism, (c) it will discuss Dworkin’s law as integrity (d) to elaborate on nature of interpretive stages, and (e) to proffers solution to the gap in knowledge in Dworkin’s constructivism. This research will be limited on Dworkin’s constructivism especially as it were discussed in his legal philosophies. Using the qualitative design in this research, this work holds that Dworkin’s constructivism, to some extent, can close the gap that leads to judicial deficiencies if applied through the regard of societal values and the court sees themselves as an observer.

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